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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON POTUS FOREIGN POLICY

An Abstract of the Thesis by
Daniel Clayton Hodges

History most often holds presidents as exclusively responsible for the success or
failure of their foreign policies. The purpose of this study is to identify the environment
that presidents operate within to develop and pursue their international relationship goals.
It is this environment itself that forms a system that exerts a great influence and is largely
responsible for and expresses the foreign policies that presidents choose. Five elements
define this system: the geopolitical situation, the actions of the prior administration,
Congress, the election cycle, and the American domestic situation (GPACED). This
work demarcates the elements of GPACED, and their potential impacts on polices,
followed by five historical case studies spanning six presidential administrations. The
National Security Act of 1947, and its subsequent amendments, created the Department
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. This law altered the nature of foreign policy development by
establishing a body for presidents to consult for policy development and decision making.
President Eisenhower’s administration embraced this law and established precedents that
are still relevant and influence today’s administrations. History holds presidents alone
accountable for foreign policy outcomes, but these case studies demonstrate that
GPACED does indeed wield a significant influence on foreign policy. This pressure
often compels presidents to undertake strategies not of their choosing, or prevents them
from executing their desired courses of action. Historical analysis further demonstrates
that GPACED follows a predictable pattern within the term limits of each presidency.
iv

Those policies judged as successes normally occur early in a president’s term in office.
GPACED most often prevents presidents from implementing chosen policies near the end
of their administrations. The case studies also demonstrate that the geopolitical
environment, and Congress are the two most influential elements of the system on foreign
policy. This study concludes that GPACED has greater influence over the direction of
United States foreign policy than the stated goals of the president, who ultimately
receives credit or blame for America’s international relations.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Seen from the perspective of a participant in a combat tour in Al Anbar province,
Iraq, it appeared in the summer of 2004 that President George Walker Bush had
needlessly endangered the lives of military service members deployed to Iraq for political
gain. His transfer of sovereignty officially recognized the authority of the independent
interim government of Iraq, which now held full responsibility for the country's
governance and, most importantly, its security. A United Nations Security Council
resolution authorized this policy as well. However, the war had rendered the Iraqis
incapable of carrying out their responsibilities, predictably leading to an increase in
coalition casualties. It was a hollow, costly move that ceded hard-won progress. By all
appearances, the transfer of sovereignty was for domestic consumption; an effort to show
President George W. Bush’s progress in Iraq to American voters on the eve of his
reelection campaign.
At the time, it was clear that there were insufficient numbers of American and
coalition troops in Iraq to accomplish the mission. The marines and soldiers in Al Anbar
province compensated for the lack of manpower by sustaining an exhaustive offensive
posture. By aggressively patrolling and raiding the enemy, they degraded their enemy's
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ability to mine roads and ambush forces in the open. After the transfer of sovereignty,
coalition forces surrendered the initiative and adopted a more passive stance that allowed
the enemy to resume the sabotage of roads critical to the support of coalition operations
throughout the country. Thus, instead of hunting down and killing the enemy, those
forces merely protected roads and support bases as best they could. Every military
member in a vehicle became a mine detector and moving target for anti-Iraqi forces.
American presidents do select military foreign policy actions for domestic
political purposes. Ample documentation exists of domestic political considerations
guiding presidents in their application of military force, often at the cost of increased risk
and danger to U.S. combat troops. The most widely accepted perception of presidential
authority places the onus of responsibility for the success or failure of foreign policies on
the president with little regard for the situation faced. Those who deal with clearly
untenable circumstances are labeled failures if their policies do not succeed, even though
a president's leadership is but one factor in a system that dates from the Eisenhower
administration. That system's influence has grown and continues to grow through the
present administration. It, rather than a succession of presidents, is the key determinant
of American foreign policy.
Admittedly, presidents take the credit and the blame for their country's military
actions and, more generally, foreign policies. Indeed, some of the latter bear the names
of the initiating administrations. The Truman Doctrine clearly credits America’s thirtythird president with a policy of supporting countries threatened by the Soviet Union or
communism; one that long outlived his time in office. Even when not named after a
president, some other foreign policies have been automatically attributed to specific
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administrations. Vietnamization, for example, belongs to Nixon. Michael H. Hunt, in
The American Ascendency: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global
Dominance (2007), argues that Congress has taken a back seat to presidential authority
ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt's final term in office. In such "imperial" presidencies,
our presidents assume a degree of authority akin to that of prime ministers and kings.
There have certainly been brief imperial periods, but the scope and complexity of U.S.
foreign policy has increased exponentially since 1945. Government bureaucracy has
grown to accommodate the expanded responsibilities of America’s increased role in
global politics, the sheer volume of tasks being far beyond any one individual's span of
control.
Associating a foreign policy with a president not only implies ownership but
connotes control. However, the degree of presidential control over the direction and
implementation of foreign policy is often deceptively small -- small enough that
responsibility and accountability are two distinct matters. This being the case, is it
always reasonable to credit a president for a success or blame him for a failure? The
answers to such questions hinge upon our definition of responsibility. If one is both
responsible and accountable for an activity, that individual must possess sufficient means
to determine its outcome. But how much actual control do presidents have over foreign
policy? In Presidential Command, Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy
From Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (2009), Peter W. Rodman tells us that presidents
who are most successful in foreign policy are those who stay personally engaged in its
execution and are, therefore, able to influence those who control the necessary resources
and means. Rodman’s assessment hardly evokes images of presidential command. In
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fact, influence over those who control the means to act is not, in and of itself, control.
Foreign policy is beyond the span of control of an individual president even though it
remains within the president's sphere of influence.
History and recent historiography both underline the limits of presidential control
over foreign policy. Ryan C. Hendrickson argues that sustained employment of military
forces is the sole purview of Congress. In The Clinton Wars: The Constitution,
Congress, and War Powers (2002), he contends that the president must consult with
Congress before employing military force. When force is employed, we see Congress
placing restrictions on how presidents may use those forces. William Bundy’s A Tangled
Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (1998), shows Richard M.
Nixon struggling to accomplish his goals after Congress denied him the ability to conduct
operations in Cambodia. Philippe R. Girard shows us the opposite scenario. In Girard’s
Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2004), we see the Congressional
Black Caucus pressuring a reluctant Bill Clinton into deploying combat forces to Haiti.
So, too, can geopolitical realities force a president to drop his human rights principles and
support a brutal dictatorship. This we see in John Dumbrell’s The Carter Presidency: A
re-evaluation (1995), when Carter aids the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to prevent them from
turning to the communist powers for support.
These earlier scenarios have bearing on perceptions of George W. Bush’s foreign
policies in Iraq. The elephant that sat in on every planning session and every current
operations section of his deployed military forces was the dearth of equipment and
manpower needed to do the job. Nobody commented on it; it was just a given. Marines
and soldiers carried on as every individual attempted to do the work of ten people so that
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the mission would be accomplished. Terry H. Anderson’s Bush’s Wars (2011) provides
some explanation for the military equipment and manpower shortages in 2004. While
skewering Bush and Rumsfeld, he nevertheless points out that both inherited the military
that they took to war -- another restriction placed on a president’s foreign policy. Indeed,
where foreign policy and, especially, the employment of military force is concerned, the
title "Commander in Chief" is itself an overstatement. "Influencer in Chief" more
accurately described the president’s role. James Schlesinger, who filled key positions in
three presidential administrations, shares his thoughts on presidential ability to enact
foreign policy in America at Century’s End (1989). Schlesinger contends that the
executive branch can only lead through persuasion. The highest art for an American
statesman, he argues, is the ability to forge consensus.
A pattern of foreign policy can be visualized. Presidents have the most influence
early in their terms. Clark A. Murdock’s Improving the Practice of National Security
Strategy: A New Approach for The Post-Cold War World (2004), shows that the election
cycle is likely to see administrations’ foreign policies driven by domestic pressures.
Murdock points out that presidential candidates often create unachievable expectations
with their campaign rhetoric and that administrations may also set out to attain the
unattainable once in power. In her analysis of several political science statistical studies,
Brandice Canes-Wrone’s Who Leads Whom (2006) finds that presidents sometimes cater
to mass opinion and support policies with which they disagree or policies that are not in
the best interest of the American public. Canes-Wrone notes that presidents engage the
public on foreign policy issues only at certain points in election cycles; especially when
they trail in the polls.
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Sam Sarkesian’s U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics
(1989) speaks of a national security system. Sarkesian describes the impact of American
democracy and our political system on foreign policy development while faulting leaders
whose understanding of national security interests and policy development is poor.
Leaders who understand the complexities of the environment in which a foreign policy is
developed are at an advantage as they can make wise decisions based on that
understanding. Sarkesian argues this point effectively, yet the complex environment of
which he writes is part of the same overall system that presidents cannot control.
Within this expanded context we can see the president less as the sole source of
responsibility for foreign policy and more as a part of a system, albeit an important part.
This system is an entity unto itself; one that ultimately determines which foreign policies
are followed and how those policies are executed. Sarkesian lists the system's
ingredients, but his focus is so narrow that a disagreement about those ingredients is
apparent. He does not discuss some aspects of foreign policy development that others
deem important to the process. Furthermore, his view of the president as only a part of a
larger system of foreign policy development and implementation only gets touched on
rather than analyzed and, most important, his writings still place the emphasis and burden
of foreign policy squarely on the shoulders of the president. Presidents are usually
judged as successes or failures based on how their personal actions and decisions affect
the outcome of their administration’s foreign policies. This emphasis on the personal
dimension gives a distorted image of the presidency's true role. The sum of the parts is
equal to the whole, but the president is only one of the parts.
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The exact nature and dimensions of the system that includes the president but
limits executive actions have not yet been established. As noted earlier, this system has
grown since the Eisenhower administration and presently plays the dominant role in
determining foreign policy. Five major components define this system: the geopolitical
situation, the actions of the prior administration, Congress, the election cycle, and the
American domestic situation. We may refer to the system as GPACED (Geopolitical
Prior Administration Congress Election Domestic) to give it an identity. Each
component of GPACED is multifaceted and has the potential to exert a significant
influence on foreign policy. For instance, the domestic situation has confounded
previous American diplomats who struggled to promote democratic principles abroad
while simultaneously justifying the country's legalized racial discrimination to foreign
emissaries.
This thesis will articulate the aspects of GPACED in concrete terms, elucidated
by historical examples from the Eisenhower administration to the Carter administration
that demonstrate how American commanders in chief are constrained and compelled.
Identification of the GPACED will provide a foundation for the body of the work: indepth discussions of its major components. The objective is to demonstrate how
GPACED itself dictates the direction and outcomes of national foreign policy.
GPACED affects all aspects of presidential authority. Domestic initiatives,
environmental policies, legal and justice reform, immigration, social initiatives, and
economic policies are subject to the same pressures and constraints that GPACED
imposes on foreign policy. But the scope of this study focuses on a president’s ability to
design, shape, and execute a foreign policy while fulfilling the duties of commander-in-
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chief within the system of GPACED. In order to provide the reader with more recent
and, therefore, familiar frames of reference, the explanation of GPACED in chapter two
uses mostly post-Carter presidency examples. The case studies then focus GPACED's
effects on each administration from Eisenhower through Carter.
Although they often weight presidential influence too heavily, extant secondary
sources have nevertheless proved the existence of GPACED by noting other influences
on foreign policy success and failure. Previously underemphasized primary sources
demonstrate that presidents altered their foreign policies to accommodate GPACED. For
instance, audio recordings capture Nixon telling Kissinger not to withdraw American
troops from Vietnam lest the South Vietnamese government collapse prior to the 1972
U.S. presidential elections. Previously unexplored primary sources also establish a new
explanation for Eisenhower's loss of trust in CIA Director Allen Dulles. And although
most of the primary sources cited on the following pages are not unique to this work,
other authors including those previously mentioned have overwhelmingly credited
presidents with the successes and failures that occurred during their respective watches.
This thesis challenges that dominant historiographical paradigm; one that has
become a common public perception. That perception not only holds the commander in
chief responsible, which it should, but accountable and liable; a much more debatable
stance when so many factors remain beyond his control. Presidents -- not legislatures -get hanged or burnt in effigy, and popular perception often influences historiography
whether professional historians care to admit it or not. Would that all causes of a foreign
policy disaster attract the wrath of protesters and the criticism of historians more fairly.
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Even if not a panacea, an understanding of GPACED is bound to put our presidents in a
more accurate historical perspective.

9

CHAPTER II

GPACED (GEOPOLITICAL, PRIOR ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, ELECTION,
DOMESTIC)

Arguments against systemic constraints on presidential foreign policies can be
found in analyses of presidential use of military forces. Ryan C. Hendrickson contends
that Congress has neglected its authority to approve the use of the nation’s military for
combat operations and that Congress -- not the president -- has the power to decide as a
body when to use military force. He further argues that a clear pattern of congressional
deference to presidential authority is due to political partisanship among members of
Congress.1 In Presidents of War (2018), Michael Beschloss also argues that presidents
have disrupted the Founders' plan, seizing the authority to launch conflicts on their own
without consulting Congress.2 Hendrickson and Beschloss make compelling arguments,
but neither considers the impact of term limits on a president’s ability to exercise control
over foreign policy. Ratified in 1951, the Twenty-second Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits presidents from being elected to that office more than

1

Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers. 1st ed.
Nashville: (Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), xiii.
2
Michael Beschloss, Presidents of War (New York: Crown, 2018), viii.

10

twice.3 Thus, election cycles since Eisenhower first took office in 1953 have often
exerted more significant constraints on national foreign policy than before. Were
presidential powers truly imperial, as Hunt proposes, presidents would do as they pleased
with unlimited resources to achieve their goals. Some might construe notable foreign
policy actions, such as Kennedy’s "quarantine" of Cuba, Nixon’s incursions into Laos
and Cambodia, Reagan’s dealings with the Iranians and Contras, or Bush’s invasion of
Panama as unilateral executive decisions made by a commander-in-chief with king-like
powers. However, these decisions were constrained acts, each president having to
contend with the will of an electorate whose position had been strengthened by term
limits and expressed through the decisions of their elected representatives. A “Lame
Duck” administration does not wield king-like authorities. Instead, term limits help
define the parameters of GPACED by marking the start and end of a president’s
participation in the system. In the end, U.S. presidents are locked into a system that
determines foreign policy possibilities and outcomes.
The first part of GPACED is geopolitics, an analysis of the geographic influences
on power relationships in international relations.4 Contemporary use of the term is
generally in reference to international relations. With respect to GPACED, geopolitical
encompasses the world situation at large, including all events that affect United States
foreign policy. These include but are not limited to intentional actions, economic
conditions, natural disasters and industrial accidents. Although identified as part of the

3
Wikipedia. “Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-second_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

“Geopolitics.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified August 9, 2019. https://www.britannica.
com/topic/geopolitics
4
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GPACED system, the geopolitical situation can be considered an environmental factor.
Much like the weather, geopolitical conditions can be projected with varying degrees of
accuracy. But although measures can be taken to mitigate anticipated circumstances,
some events can remain beyond a president’s control as if he were caught outside in an
un-forecasted downpour without an umbrella. International settings for United States
national security can present five dangers: (a) they are contradictory and complex, (b)
they may be ill-defined and irrational, (c) they may develop quickly with little time for
understanding and analysis, (d) policies may require secrecy and covert operations, and
(e) international actors may have more freedom of action than Americans to move
quickly and conduct covert actions. Not needing the support of either government or
governed often works to their advantage.5
Any international happening that bears significantly on United States foreign
relations is part of this system. The geopolitical situation presents extra challenges for
American presidents, as America is in perpetual competition with the world. Most
nations reasonably pursue policies that are in their own best interests. Not only do those
policies often conflict or compete with United States foreign policy goals, but it is
common practice for some nation-states to obscure their objectives – think national
secrets – and methods to shield their efforts from other nations’ reprisals or
counterefforts. Even with capable intelligence assets, many an American president has
been thoroughly surprised with a sudden change in the geopolitical environment. India’s
successful second detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1998, which prompted neighboring

5

Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 17-18.
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Pakistan to detonate its own nuclear weapon a few weeks later, was a shock to the
Clinton administration.6 The South Asian political landscape was drastically altered as
two bitter rivals habitually at war over border disputes suddenly developed a capacity for
mass destruction.
The geopolitical situation does not respect term limits. On occasion, other
governments take advantage of American election cycles. For example, the Trump
administration is struggling to achieve a trade deal with China. As Trump’s term in
office nears its end, international political analyst Reva Goujon judges that China is
waiting for a change of administrations before making any lasting trade agreements with
the United States.7 World events can also generate domestic support for American action
or intervention. Presidents can be compelled to react or face political consequences if
they do not take action to mitigate the impact of sudden foreign political upheaval or
environmental disaster. George Friedman aptly describes the geopolitical environment,
arguing that a president's foreign policy is a function of the situation in which he finds
himself and that those situations, rather than presidential will, dictate foreign policy
decisions.8 Presidential reactions to unforeseen world events and the rest of the system of
GPACED can also have lasting implications beyond the present administration, just as
prior administration actions affect the current administration.

6

Richard A. Best, Jr., "U.S. Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned," Every
CRSReport.com 98, no. 672 (August 1998): 2.
7
Reva Goujon, “US Adversaries and Allies: Start the Countdown to 2020” Stratfor Worldview,
June 22, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-adversaries-and-allies-start-countdown-2020presidential-election-iran-china-russia-north-korea-eu-japan-mexico-israel-poland Accessed 4 September
2019
8
George Friedman, “The Trump Doctrine” GPF Geopolitical Futures, (Texas) July 11, 2018.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-trump-doctrine
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One of President Clinton’s first term challenges was the fallout from the
“Blackhawk Down” incident in Somalia. Clinton pulled the United States out of Somalia
when eighteen American servicemen were killed in a fight with Somali warlord
militiamen.9 But Clinton had not chosen to deploy America’s military to Somalia in the
first place -- that decision was made during the final year of George H.W. Bush's
administration. The geopolitical environment – part of the system – set conditions that
pressured Bush to ameliorate the human tragedy brought on by drought, famine, civil war
and lawlessness in Somalia -- even if he had to deploy troops.10 Those troops were still
in place when Clinton took over as commander-in-chief, so the system also compelled
him to deal with a foreign policy issue not of his choosing.
But even without troops deployed in overseas combat situations, prior
administrations leave a host of foreign policy constraints and limitations for incoming
presidents. Previous resource and planning allocations matter as well. Any foreign
policy goals or visons are tempered by the previous administration's accomplishments.
Defenses budgets, foreign aid allocations, weapons procurement, military personnel
strength, prior diplomatic engagement with nation states, foreign territory usage, and
basing rights are but a few of the factors that weigh heavily on subsequent
administrations. The Department of Defense arranges for security cooperation programs
that partner United States military forces in training and exchanges with foreign
militaries. The Department of State conducts security assistance programs that help

9
Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama, (New York:
Vintage Books, 2014), 260.
10
Robert F. Bauman, and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the
World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2004), 23.
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provide foreign governments military infrastructure, and financial/economic incentives.
Both programs can take months and years of planning before an agreement to carry out
the exchanges and activities ever goes into effect. Providing the resources for these
activities is a complicated, ponderous process that is difficult to reverse once put in
motion. Decisions made by presidents and supported by Congress set limits and
constraints that can last for multiple presidential terms. Consider the current process for
developing the national security strategy. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates a methodical approach for the
development of national security strategy, and requires the executive branch to produce a
written plan that identifies America’s national interests.11
The president’s published national security strategy relies heavily on America’s
military element of power to set in motion a series of actions that dictate America’s
worldwide military posture. The size of the military, the type of forces it generates,
where those forces are based, its missions, and the skill sets of its members all hinge on
the resources allocated by Congress to accomplish the approved security strategy. Once
the resources are provided, the Department of Defense adjusts its forces to comply with
the national security strategy. In some instances, minor adjustments suffice, but in most
cases, significant effort is involved, entailing lengthy, time-consuming actions to build,
prepare, and posture the force.
Figure 1 (below) illustrates the bureaucratic complexity of developing and
resourcing the military to meet the requirements of the national security strategy.

11

Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretle Eds. A National Security Strategy Primer,
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019), 4.
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Consider the time span between the various documents that guide development and use
of forces.

Figure 1. Purple Pipeline Strategic Planning
The national military strategy published in 2016 leads, in part, to a guide for the potential
type of, and use of those forces needed in 2020. The Purple Pipeline illustrates the
relationship between national strategic guidance to planning and employing forces.12
This four-year planning time span depicted in Figure 1 clearly illustrates how the current
administration’s actions build the military used by future presidents. However, despite

12

Brian Allen, Lesson Plan for C204, Joint Planning Systems (Ft. Leavenworth: CGSC, 2019), 1-

4.
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this planning process, the president’s national security strategies are not necessarily
provided enough resources to accomplish their objectives. Congress often demonstrates
that Bulwer-Lytton was right about the pen being mightier than the sword, by either
providing far less funding than the president’s national security strategy requires or none
altogether. Under such conditions, applying that strategy might be difficult, if not
impossible. This procedure continues to evolve with each new administration. While
this exact process did not exist during Eisenhower’s administration, similar mechanisms
exerted the same constraints on his and all subsequent administrations.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2020 has yet to become law.
This act is the primary legislation that will provide resources to carry out the national
security strategy. In its current form, the bill contains provisions that would force
President Trump to remove troops from Yemen and end support for the Saudi-backed
forces there. It would also prohibit the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey.13 Both
these provisions would prevent the Trump administration from executing aspects of its
current foreign policy. Another challenge to Trump’s defense appropriations legislation
is an amendment, passed by the House of Representatives, calling for a formal
investigation into allegations that secret military biological weapons experiments
unleashed weaponized ticks that spread Lyme Disease to the American public.14 At the

13

Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
H.R. 2968, Congressional Record, 116-103, (May 23, 2019). https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/2968?q=%7B%22search %22%3A%5B%22Department+of+Defense+Appropriations
+Act%22% 5D%7D&r=2&s=4

14

Lia Eustachewich, “House Orders Pentagon to Reveal if it Turned Ticks into Biological
Weapons,” New York Post, (New York) July 17, 2019. https://nypost.com/2019/07/17/house-orderspentagon-to-reveal-if-it-turned-ticks-into-biological-weapons/.
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very least, this amendment will delay the passage of the Defense Appropriations Act,
adding more uncertainty and friction to the process of funding the military.
Further complicating passage of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act
2020 is an additional provision that repeals the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force law. These provisions require removal of troops used under the 2001 law after 240
days of deployment. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Bill is an openended authorization for presidents to deploy military forces against any entity associated
with the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the United States.15 This law has been
invoked several times to authorize military operations in support of their presidential
policies. Repeated attempts at repeal are examples of Congress, as part of the GPACED
system, wielding significant power and asserting its authority over the executive branch.
America’s military often dominates other elements of national power, but
diplomacy is also essential to the success of presidential foreign policy. Diplomatic
measures carried out by the Department of State, although less expensive than "big stick"
military budgets, are also subject to GPACED. Congress uses its powers to influence or
even dominate United States foreign policy. In 1955, Eisenhower’s secretary of state,
John Foster Dulles, withdrew offers to support construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam
when faced with pressure from Congress. Backed by cotton industry lobbyists, southern
Democratic congressmen were opposing support for the dam even before Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded American recognition of the People's Republic
of China, and it was Congressional opposition that convinced Dulles to recommend

15

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Statutes at Large 115, sec. 224 and 225 (2001).
https://www.congress. gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint resolution/23?q=%7B %22search%22%3A%
222001+Authorization +for+Use+of+Military+Force%22%7D&s=4&r=18.
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withdrawal of funding.16 This incident contributed to Egypt joining the Soviet sphere of
influence, thus complicating Eisenhower’s Middle East foreign policy.
Some congressmen attempt to take matters of foreign policy into their own hands
by talking directly to foreign governments without Executive Branch consent.17 Former
secretary of state, Democratic presidential candidate, and senator John Kerry (D-MA)
admitted to conducting unsanctioned diplomatic talks with Iran, advising the Iranians to
pursue other options while openly criticizing Trump’s foreign policy.18 As a senator
during the Reagan administration, Kerry participated in another unsanctioned diplomatic
mission when he and Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), both from the opposition party,
traveled to Nicaragua to negotiate a deal with the Sandinistas that conflicted with
Reagan’s foreign policy.19 In speaking about this trip, Kerry clearly attempted to dictate
American foreign policy, and the Reagan administration's response showed the disruption
Kerry had caused. Said Kerry, “Senator Harkin and I are going to Nicaragua as Vietnamera veterans who are alarmed that the Reagan administration is repeating the mistakes we
made in Vietnam. Our foreign policy should represent the democratic values that have
made our country great, not subvert those values by funding terrorism to overthrow
governments of other countries.” Secretary of State George Shultz decried these “selfappointed emissaries to the Communist regime” in Managua, complaining that he could
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not "conduct a successful policy when [such people] take trips or write ‘Dear
Comandante’ letters with the aim of negotiating.” Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger added that “[i]f the Nicaraguans want to make an offer, they ought to make it
through diplomatic channels. We can’t be negotiating with our own congressmen and
Nicaragua simultaneously.20”
Congress can also pass laws designed precisely to thwart presidential foreign
policy actions. Some of these laws are aimed at specific policies, and generally only
affect the current administration. The 1984 Boland Amendment expressly prohibited any
funding of military or para-military activities in Nicaragua, thereby crippling Reagan’s
efforts to aid the Contra rebels. Faced with a choice of obeying Congressional will or
helping the Contras, Reagan chose the latter, leading his administration into the IranContra scandal.21 Congress also has the power to create laws that have long-term foreign
policy implications for future presidents. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 remains a
source of congressional-executive friction. This legislation was passed by Congress
during the Nixon administration to prevent future presidents from deploying military
forces without consultation. It places limits on what a president may do with military
forces by requiring the president to seek congressional approval for the employment of
force.
The 1973 law stipulates three circumstances in which the president can use
military force: a declaration of war by Congress, statutory approval from Congress, or a
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national emergency in which U.S. territories or possessions are attacked. Any use of
force or deployment of forces equipped for combat into the territory, waters or airspace
of a foreign nation falls under the purview of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3 of
the law further specifies that presidents must consult with Congress before and after
troops are introduced into combat, and that presidents must report any use of force within
48 hours. There is also a time limit: presidents have 60 days after notifying Congress
with a 30-day extension possible to gain Congressional agreement. If congressional
consent is not given, the president must recall forces and cease hostilities.22
Hendrickson, Beschloss, and others assert that Congress neither exercises its full
authority nor holds presidents accountable to the War Powers Resolution and that
presidents regularly violate the law when deploying military forces in support of their
foreign policies. Such opinions elevate presidential authority above the constraints of
GPACED but, as we have seen, a president cannot deploy and sustain forces without the
resources that Congress provides. Congress has also enacted subsequent legislation that
prohibits presidents from carrying out desired foreign policy courses of action.
Convincing arguments support the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution in
controlling the deployment of America’s military forces. One contends that the War
Powers Resolution's mere existence alters presidential behavior, thereby meeting the
intent of the resolution. This opinion also accounts for perceived congressional inaction.
David P. Auerswald, and Peter F. Cowhey argue that the War Powers Resolution does
meet the intent of the law. “Congress rarely uses the Act not because of collective action
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problems or electoral fears, but rather because presidents tailor their behavior to abide by
the Act's provisions, thus avoiding a series of constitutional battles over the use of force
that would benefit neither branch of government.23” By rule of law, Congress holds
sway over the executive branch both legally and fiscally. Not only can Congress
withhold funding for a president's favored foreign policy but it can also force the
president to execute specific foreign policies that he does not support.
Congress can also influence or prevent presidents from conducting covert
operations in support of foreign policy goals. Administrations use covert operations and
secret military deployments to achieve objectives and set conditions that conventional
military deployments and diplomacy cannot, but such operations often create controversy
between Congress and the executive branch. Although the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) has been accountable to Congress since its inception, the Intelligence Oversight
Act of 1980 added reporting requirements to better keep select committees of Congress in
the loop. When committee members object to a covert operation, they hold talks with the
administration to stop or alter it. When these disagreements cannot be resolved,
Congressmen often add pressure by "leaking" classified information to the media either
in or out of context. This illegal dissemination of classified information by legislators is
usually enough to enforce the congressional majority's will.24
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As a body, Congress typically reflects the political leanings of the general
population, and presidents must contend with the political makeup of both houses. While
it is an advantage for the president’s party to hold majorities in both the House and the
Senate, presidents rarely enjoy an uninterrupted two-house majority. George H.W.
Bush’s party held the House but was in the minority in the Senate, a political split that
doomed fifty percent of administration-supported legislation to defeat. By his fourth
year, that figure dipped to forty percent. Even when presidents enjoy a two-house
majority, they often suffer declining Congressional support towards the end of their
terms; Barack Obama’s legislative success declined during the 111th Congress even
though the Democrats controlled both houses. George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W.
Bush and Obama all garnered less support from Congress towards the end of their terms
in office.25 Post-World War II presidents who served two terms all saw declines in
Congressional support towards the end of their first terms, even though their reelection
bids were successful. This demonstrates the negative impact of the election cycle on
presidential initiatives that include foreign policy.
America’s elected politicians are beholden to their constituents. Although
presidential terms are four years, each president must campaign every two years to
support his party’s congressional election efforts as well. At best, this election cycle
distracts the president from foreign policy efforts. At their worst, elections can alter
foreign policy for the sake of garnering public support; presidents who trail in the polls
sometimes adopt a popular foreign policy even though they disagree with it. Similarly,
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Congress sways toward a president’s preference if the voters support it, and away from a
president’s preference if the voters oppose it.26
How the Commander-in-Chief of America’s armed forces, and the chief executive
responsible for U.S. foreign policy gains those positions is crucial. Elections are as much
a part of GPACED as any other factor, as presidents ultimately answer to the voting
citizen. That citizen, in turn, is accountable for the person he or she chooses to lead
national foreign policy. Presidents simply may not act in any way they see fit without
support from the nation's elected representatives. To do so is to risk punishment by
Congress.
Elections allow America to either support a president, by voting for the
representatives who support presidential policies in the Congressional elections, or reject
a president by choosing Congressional representatives who oppose presidential policies.
The election cycle also provides resiliency in recovering from mistakes. A new president
can rapidly reverse the problems of the previous administration, but the system can also
make it hard to develop and manage strategies since current administrations must work
within the resource limits provided by previous ones. Most importantly, those
responsible for developing and executing foreign policies do not control all of the assets
needed to accomplish the strategies. The American political system of elections
influences national security development. Because the system is open to the public, the
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people's will gives legitimacy to decisions.27 Policy approval's very public nature can
also benefit national adversaries who try to use the American political system to thwart
actions that work to their disadvantage. The influence of the public on the system ties a
president’s success or failure to the American domestic situation.
The domestic component to GPACED -- the situation in America and American
society -- is the home equivalent of the geopolitical situation discussed earlier.
Purposeful man-made events, economic factors, mass calamity due to natural disaster or
industrial-scale accidents, and any events or conditions that sway public opinion are also
environmental factors. America’s prosperity is key. A poor economy means fewer
resources available for foreign policy support, and less opportunity for the average
citizen; high unemployment can turn the voter against a president even though his foreign
policy is a success. The success of a policy can also have more to do with the attitudes
and personalities of the political leadership than any formal political process.28
Scandals involving presidents are a common occurrence in many administrations.
During the Korean Police Action, a war that was not well supported by the American
public, Truman dealt with charges of being soft on communism and sheltering
communist sympathizers within his administration.29 President Trump has been dogged
by accusations that he colluded with Russia to sway the result of the general election in
his favor. These scandals can seriously detract from a president’s ability to conduct
foreign policy. Allegations of illicit behavior are also political weapons against sitting

27

Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1989), 45.
28

Ibid., 115.

29

George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 649.

25

administrations because presidential administrations can expend considerable time and
resources when refuting accusations and containing damage. Scandals contribute to the
general public's perception of the president, a figure who must sustain rapport with the
public to be effective. The primary means of presidential communication with the
general population is through the media.
The role of the media as the chief means of executive branch communication
complicates the relationship between the president and the people. The media can be an
asset to a president or a liability. In addition to serving as a source of information to the
public, it is very much a component of the political landscape with its own agendas, some
of which support or oppose foreign policy and national security strategies. Opinion polls
whose results are shaped by a largely uninformed public often compound that public
ignorance by oversimplifying the issues. The political affiliation of a president can also
be an asset or a liability, as leading media professionals are statistically proven to hold
liberal ideologies and most often align their organizations with Democratic party
agendas.30 Political affiliation can also align with or pit presidents against interest
groups. Interest groups have specific agendas and often couple with the media to
promote or refute foreign policy actions. Working for powerful organizations, supported
by lobbies, interest groups influence key members of Congress and seek to gain the
support of the general public in achieving their agendas.
The domestic situation can be the deciding factor in the success or failure of
foreign policy. A hurricane, riot, stock market crash, or revelation of hush-money
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payments to a porn star can all have the potential to disrupt or altogether thwart
presidential foreign policy actions. Each facet of GPACED alone can derail policies, but
the limitations and effects of GPACED can be especially difficult to overcome when
combined. Some administrations succumb to the effects and have major foreign policy
failures. Other administrations, whose president and key advisors are knowledgeable and
experienced, can mitigate the impacts of GPACED. How presidents are equipped to deal
with the system plays a role in their foreign policy success or failure.
The president’s personal foreign policy qualifications, those of his advisors, how
he organizes them, and the decisions he makes are all crucial aspects. The system largely
decides the first aspect, and not all presidents are elected for their foreign policy
expertise. What the president has personally brought to the office in terms of foreign
policy and organizational knowledge varies widely. Americans elected George H. W.
Bush, who arguably had one of the best foreign policy resumes. The United States also
elected Donald Trump, whose background suggests that he was largely ignorant of
foreign policy matters and government organization before he took office -- not the first
presidential foreign policy rookie by any means. But regardless of individual
qualifications, it is highly unlikely that any president can be cognizant of and fully
competent in the entirety of the vast, complex system of foreign policy. Presidents
compensate for a lack of personal experience and knowledge of foreign policy by
selecting key personnel to provide advice and counsel. Selecting the best people to fill
these roles, and knowing when to replace them if they are not achieving the desired
results are critical decisions.
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The second aspect is the selection of advisors, a process influenced by the system
as well. The National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments created the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the
CIA. This Act intended that the principal advisors for national security reside in the
National Security Council. All the statutory members of the National Security Council
are civilians.31 The president may select those individuals who provide principal advice
through the National Security Council, but the statutory members of the National
Security Council are confirmed by the Senate, which exposes the president to the
influence, or partisanship of Congress. This is where GPACED can influence the
selection of key personnel, for some are chosen for their political affiliations versus their
suitability for the job. Although not required by law, the National Security Council
includes an Assistant for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National
Security Advisor, who serves as the president’s chief advisor on national security. Since
Congress does not control this position, the president is free to choose a National Security
Advisor who is like-minded and supportive of the administration’s foreign policy
philosophies.
The third consideration is how presidents organize their foreign policy teams.
The president can empower the National Security Advisor to do this, elevating him nearly
to the rank of statutory cabinet member. Some presidents minimize the role of the
National Security Council, while others rely heavily on it. Primary National Security
Council members each have their own separate power bases. As a body, the NSC can
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formulate its own policy options or oppose other courses of action, but it does not have
an operational arm to execute any options on its own. Conversely, the State and Defense
Departments, and sometimes the CIA, have all the resources to implement foreign
policies budgeted by Congress. These power relationship dynamics make for a
challenging command and control situation. The effectiveness of the National Security
Advisor can be crucial in coordinating the implementation of administration foreign
policies.
The national security advisor along with the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State form a triad of foreign policy development and execution for the
president. The powers and relationships of these three key positions are critical to the
president for shaping the security strategy. The Department of State operates with
traditional diplomacy that focuses on negotiations and compromise. The State
Department normally runs primary diplomatic exchanges. This department is very
bureaucratic and somewhat entrenched in its methods and philosophical approaches to
foreign policy. Department of State personnel can be obstinate, reticent and difficult for
some administrations to control. The Department of Defense tends to lean towards
military responses. Presidential responsibilities as commander-in-chief are usually
exercised through the Defense Department. It is not unusual for State and Defense to
work at cross purposes, which harms foreign policy efforts. The president’s National
Security Advisor ideally deconflicts and synchronizes foreign policy efforts between
State and Defense.32 However, presidents do not always rely on this triad to formulate
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and execute foreign policy. Regardless of who presidents depend on, choosing the
“right” people for these critical positions, and how an administration organizes its foreign
policy teams are among the most important decisions a president can make before
assuming office.
This brings us to the fourth consideration, which is the foreign policy decisions
the president makes while in office. Ostensibly, this consideration should carry the most
culpability for presidents, as they selected the courses of action. But, as we shall see,
GPACED often imposes severe restrictions on a president’s freedom of action. If a
president is forced to choose a bad course of action that is neither appropriate nor suitable
to the task but politically feasible or demanded, who is responsible for the outcome of
that task? Is the execution of this bad foreign policy the fault of the president or is it the
fault of GPACED, which forced the president’s hand?
Personal experience, selecting key personnel, organizing to develop, and execute
foreign policy, and the foreign policy decisions made during their time in office are
within the purview of the president. A president who rates highly in these four areas has
an advantage over those less qualified and not as adept at organizing. But GPACED does
not discriminate -- it affects each administration.
The concept of GPACED can be used to paint a picture of the significant foreign
policy events of every president. This graphic is a visual summary of the key events of
each administration, where those events align with GPACED, and how GPACED
influenced the foreign policies of the administrations. This depiction is not a scientific,
statistical instrument; rather, it is a visual representation of the subjective assessments of
GPACED and its influences on American foreign policy.
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The constant, or reference line, for this visual is defined by what the president
intended to achieve with their administration’s foreign policy. This goal occupies the
center of the chart in Figure 2 below, forming the baseline. Foreign policy events that
generally conform to the administration’s desired goals are depicted along this baseline.
When GPACED prevents a goal from being achieved, meaning little change occurs, the
event or condition is displayed below the baseline. When GPACED compels foreign
policy actions that are generally opposite of the president’s foreign policy goals, the
forcing event or condition is displayed above the baseline. The dominant element(s) of
GPACED that prevent or compel foreign policy, as represented by their corresponding
letters to the acronym, are indicated next to each event.
The example provided here uses President Trump’s current administration to
illustrate a graphic depiction of the apparent impact of GPACED on his administration’s
foreign policy. The understanding, of course, is that Trump’s administration is not
complete at the time of these writings, and has yet to be properly analyzed and assessed
from a historical perspective.
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Figure 2. Sample visualization of impact of GPACED Trump administration.
For the purpose of this sample visualization of the Trump administration, we use George
Freidman’s assessment of Trump’s foreign policy. Friedman judges Trump’s foreign
policy goals as seeking to defuse situations that might require military actions, instead of
engaging in an offensive foreign economic policy, while disregarding opinions from
abroad in the broadest sense.33 Note that foreign polices evolve throughout every
administration; for the purpose of this example, Trump’s foreign policy goals remain
constant. At a glance, this visualization shows the extent to which Trump is either
compelled or restrained from accomplishing his stated foreign policy goals. The
geopolitical environment and Congress appear to be the dominant factors in Trump’s
foreign policy achievements.

George Friedman, “The Trump Doctrine” GPF Geopolitical Futures, (Texas) July 11, 2018.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-trump-doctrine.
33

32

The following chapters are an analysis of GPACED's impacts on the key foreign
policy actions of presidential administrations from Eisenhower to Carter. Discussions of
individual administration foreign policies are not exhaustive; the emphasis is on wellknown primary events. Each administration is viewed from the perspective of the
elements of GPACED. Following the analysis, the administrations are summarized with
a graphic representation that effectively displays the influence of GPACED on the
foreign policies of each president.
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CHAPTER III

EISENHOWER
Case study analysis begins with Eisenhower’s presidency because his
administration embraced the intent of the National Security Act of 1947 by developing
and implementing procedures that employed the National Security Council structure.
While the National Security Council continued to evolve with subsequent
administrations, vestiges of Eisenhower’s construct are reflected in every one of them
and are a consistent part of foreign policy making. Eisenhower was uniquely qualified to
serve as president during the time of his administration. Few had his leadership
experience on the world stage. He had a firm grasp of America’s standing and its
relationships in the international community. General Eisenhower commanded armies
alongside the world’s leaders on the grand theater of the World War Two battlefields. As
president, he continued this association with many of these same international leaders.
He also faced some of his former allies as international competitors and adversaries, and
his personal knowledge and insight into the personalities of these world leaders were a
unique asset to his administration’s foreign policy efforts. Another exceptional personal
aspect of Eisenhower, a feature that further sets him apart from all his presidential peers,
is that his motivations for holding the office of the President of the United States appear
to be truly altruistic. He did not seek office and was not a career politician. In 1952 he
34

agreed to represent the Republicans after they aggressively sought him out and pressured
him to run as their presidential candidate. President Eisenhower continued to
demonstrate this altruism during the Suez Canal incident, which occurred on the eve of
the election for his second term. Counseled not to risk alienating Jewish voters by
publicly going against Israel, the president stated that he did not care about the election.34
He based his decision on the merits of the situation rather than the influence of the
American voter.
Accustomed to grim decisions and working with senior Allied military leaders
and heads of state, Eisenhower remarked on his first day in office that he had “[p]lenty of
worries and difficult problems. But such has been my portion for a long time…the result
is that this just seems (today) like a continuation of all I’ve been doing since July
1941…even before that.” His leadership experience at the military and national level
made him more qualified to serve as commander-in-chief than any of his contemporary
peers.
Eisenhower’s key foreign policy advisor was Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles. Although illness forced him to resign near the end of Eisenhower’s final term in
office, Dulles exerted a major influence on foreign policy. Dulles had a pedigree for his
job and previous experience with international politics, his grandfather and uncle having
served as secretaries of state for presidents Harrison and Wilson. As a young man, he
participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Dulles’ experience, like-minded
views of America’s role in the international community, and close friendship with
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Eisenhower made him an ideal foreign policy advisor.35 Two other advisors that
Eisenhower relied heavily on were Robert Cutler, his special assistant for national
security affairs, and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, the secretary of state's brother.
Eisenhower’s relationship with Allen Dulles proved to be a much more challenging
association. Even though exceptionally qualified, Dulles did not always use the freedom
of action allowed by Eisenhower wisely and significant problems resulted. With his
extensive military background, the president preferred to keep his military advisors at
arm’s length, also troublesome for Eisenhower because his three successive secretaries of
defense were ineffective.36
The administration was well organized and had an efficient foreign policy
planning process. Upon entering office, Eisenhower instituted a military-like staff
process of routine national security planning sessions, with Cutler an integral part of the
National Security Council. After participating in the NSC meetings for three months,
Cutler codified the duties and responsibilities of the existing members, made
recommended changes to the basic structure, and added permanent personnel to maintain
an apolitical continuity to the staff functions of the council. His role – the special
assistant for national security affairs – ensured that the president’s views for policyplanning were carried out. He acted as executive officer at council meetings and presided
over the planning board.37 Eisenhower attended National Security Council meetings on a
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weekly basis and, in addition to these weekly formal meetings, frequently met for
informal conferences to discuss policy with key trusted advisors. Using these gatherings
as a forum for consideration of major foreign policy issues, he insisted his staff members
present analyses of the issues to the security council in highly digested forms with
options clearly distinguished. Eisenhower relied on his staff to manage the details,
preferring to focus on the bigger picture. This allowed him to see each action in context,
and how it related to his overall foreign policy.38
That foreign policy was a continuation of the Truman administration’s policy of
containment -- containing the spread of America’s communist enemies rather than
seeking their immediate destruction.39 Using his skills for organization and staff work,
Eisenhower commissioned a long-term study group to develop his administration’s own
version of this security strategy. Called Project Solarium, these strategic planners
developed three options to defend against the global communist threat. When
Eisenhower ordered the study, he clearly had military organization in mind; he instructed
that “[t]he preparation should be as for a War College project, and might be done at the
War College, utilizing also its top personnel and facilities.”40 The outcome of Project
Solarium was the adoption of a National Security Council document that selected the
preferred course of action. NSC-162/2 called for a move away from reliance on large
conventional forces and emphasis on the threat of nuclear retaliation instead. Eisenhower
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strongly believed that the United States should avoid getting sucked into wars like the
one being fought in Korea when he took office. At the same time, he sought to reduce
the enormous amount of spending on military systems for national defense. NSC 162/2
also emphasized asymmetric responses such as covert operations, economic aid, and
military assistance to those non-communist countries threatened by communist takeover.
To empower an increase in covert operations, Eisenhower successfully gained approval
of an additional National Security Council directive: NSC-5412, a directive on covert
operations that funneled economic and military aid directly to anti-communist groups
without involving American military forces.41
The Eisenhower administration named this strategy the New Look, but its
emphasis on the nuclear threat made it known to the world as Massive Retaliation. When
John Foster Dulles announced in a 1954 speech that the United States would rely on its
retaliatory capacity to deter aggression however and wherever it chose, the Soviets and
and Communist Chinese perceived a worst case: nuclear counterstrikes aimed at their
economic and political centers even in response to the most limited aggression.42 This
New Look/Massive Retaliation strategy guided Eisenhower throughout both terms of his
administration despite its potential for destabilization.
Considered in light of the U.S. presidency's foreign policy role, Eisenhower must
be rated favorably. His personal qualifications were ideal for the times -- he was
experienced and understood the systems provided for foreign policy making. Aside from
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the three successive secretaries of defense, he selected knowledgeable, experienced,
competent people to serve in key advisory positions and his talent for organization,
command, and control enabled him to manage America’s foreign policy by adapting the
existing structures and procedures to the environment that he faced. Experienced key
personnel complemented his administration, allowing him to deal with the complexities
of foreign policy. Even so, GPACED imposed itself on President Eisenhower and forced
him away from his stated goals on several occasions.
One of the first challenges Eisenhower faced was ending the Korean conflict. He
even considered using nuclear weapons and leaking this possibility to the Chinese and
Soviets. To his credit, the July 1953 armistice might not have been possible without that
threat. In 1962, John F. Kennedy’s defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, called on
then former President Eisenhower for advice on Kennedy’s foreign policy in South East
Asia. When questioned on the issue of Chinese military assistance to the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam, Eisenhower reminded McNamara of the measures he had taken to end
the Korean War, especially his warnings to the Chinese that their territory north of the
Yalu River would no longer be off limits to American air power, and that he would not
be limited in the weapons he used.43 This nuclear threat had proven a powerful
diplomatic tool in convincing communist regimes to stop fighting. On the other hand, it
did not liberate anyone or reduce military spending in Korea. Instead of honoring
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campaign promises, he settled for the status quo, extending Truman’s version of
containment.44
Eisenhower’s efforts to use asymmetric methods proved successful at first. In
Guatemala and Iran, his administration conducted low-cost, CIA-led operations that
provided direction and funneled aid, arms, and financial support directly to anticommunist political groups. A June 1954 telegram from John Peurifoy, the American
Ambassador to Guatemala, shows how the State Department cooperated with the CIA to
set the conditions for the American-instigated coup there. Peurifoy noted that the
targeted Guatemalan regime had successfully lowered tensions in the country and was
making political gains that strengthened its hold on power. He further stated that if
Eisenhower made a negative public statement about the situation and renounced a U.S.Guatemalan trade deal, the trend could be reversed.45 The Guatemalan and Iranian
operations placed pro-Western leaders in control and kept two countries out of the
communist sphere of influence quickly and quietly in support of Eisenhower’s foreign
policy.46
In Vietnam, however, New Look containment failed and the communists gained
control of North Vietnam. America provided only material support for the French,
leaving their conventional troops at home while the French struggled against the Viet
Minh. However, direct intervention had been considered in late December of 1953;
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reinforcing the French with American military power was an option, as was replacing
French troops should France quit the fight. Each of these options contained both
coalition and unilateral plans for U.S. military operations against the Viet Minh.47
Eisenhower also considered supporting a deployment of Republic of Korea (ROK) troops
to help the French, and Allen Dulles’ CIA thus assessed likely global reactions to such a
plan. In the CIA's report, Dulles predicted that South Korean troops would most
certainly be viewed as proxies for America and possibly draw similar reactions from the
larger communist powers. He also concluded that the French and the British would
oppose ROK intervention, particularly because it would show America's lack of
confidence in French military capability and thus cause a blow to French national
prestige.48
No South Korean troops deployed to Vietnam at that time and, even if they had,
the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu would have brought Eisenhower closer to
intervening than before. He did use the threat of nuclear arms to prevent Chinese
intervention, but the Chinese provided the Vietminh with military equipment and supplies
nevertheless -- support that was instrumental in their victory.49 The Geneva Accords of
1954 were signed, withdrawing French troops from the region and establishing a ceasefire and partition of Vietnam, ending the First Indochina War. A progress report to
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Eisenhower’s National Security Council summarized these agreements as “completing a
major forward stride for communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia.”50
The United States refused to sign the agreement, and Eisenhower reacted to the
establishment of a communist-controlled North Vietnam by creating the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO). Otherwise, he reasoned, the “Domino Effect” would
spread communism throughout the region. Under SEATO, defense depended on Asian
ground troops backed up by American airpower and military advisors. It conformed to
the New Look strategy by using less direct involvement and empowering anticommunist
governments to fight communist takeover while American threats of retaliation kept the
Chinese at bay.51
The passage of the Formosa Resolution in early 1955 again tested the New Look
This resolution authorized Eisenhower to use the full range of military options should the
Chinese attempt to seize Formosa and its adjacent islands, and he aimed his signing
statement on this resolution squarely at China. “We are ready to support a United
Nations effort to end the present hostilities in the area" he declared, "but we also are
united in our determination to defend an area vital to the security of the United States and
the free world.”52 The resolution was the result of Communist Chinese attacks on
offshore islands claimed by the Nationalist Chinese, Quemoy Island being the main bone
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of contention. Even after a large American show of force involving aircraft carriers and
attack aviation positioned on Formosa, China continued to make overt moves to seize
Quemoy. Eisenhower resorted to another atomic threat during a March 16, 1955, press
conference to deter the Communists Chinese. The threat worked, and Communist China
ceased hostilities.53
Meanwhile, Allen Dulles and the CIA acquired the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft,
providing Eisenhower with a lead over the Soviets in strategic intelligence gathering.
This spy asset allowed him to see that America still had a sizable advantage in strategic
weapons, despite a widely held public belief that the Soviets were far superior. In 1956,
the U-2 gathered information on the Soviets as they sent troops into Hungary to put down
a revolution and discovered British, French, and Israeli troop buildups in the Eastern
Mediterranean. At the heart of the latter crisis was a souring of Anglo-Egyptian relations
after World War Two. Heavy-handed actions by British troops defending the Suez Canal
had inflamed Egyptian nationalists. A 1936 treaty had authorized the British presence,
but a British embargo on fuel oil to the Egyptians living in the canal zone and the cutoff
of fuel supplies in retaliation for Egyptian interference with British trains caused Egypt to
abrogate in October 1951. Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador to Egypt, intervened
and eased tensions a bit, but when American politicians withdrew United States offers to
fund construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser nationalized the canal.54 Some wondered about American motives. Remarking
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on Democratic charges that the Republicans had pulled funding for the dam in order to
weaken the Southern cotton industry's foreign competition, Alabama columnist Ray
Tucker saw the move as a transparent effort to buy Southern votes. It had released five
million bales of American cotton onto the world market, he claimed.55
Meanwhile, the British concocted a scheme to regain control of the Suez Canal.
While Israel attacked Egypt, Great Britain and France intervened under the guise of
keeping this strategic waterway open to world commerce. Nasser responded by blocking
the canal with sunken ships, and Eisenhower’s administration publicly condemned the
Anglo-French attack, using economic sanctions and an oil embargo to force England,
France, and Israel to withdraw. Both America and the Soviet Union supported a United
Nations Security Council resolution condemning the attack on Egypt, but Eisenhower
still warned the Soviets to stay out of the conflict and further elaborated on Nikita
Khrushchev's threat of intervention in a post-presidency interview. Eisenhower
instructed Dulles to tell the Russians that the Americans would counteract anything they
did; that even though he did not agree with the French and British, they were still
America’s allies, and he would defend them.56 Both the Soviet Union and the United
States began preparations for a general war over the incident. American general
preparedness for combat operations started October 29, 1956, when the Joint Chiefs of
Staff prepared for a joint force deployment to the Mediterranean.57 In the end, the 1956
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Suez Canal Incident destabilized an already volatile Middle East situation and moved
Egypt closer to the Soviet sphere of influence.58
This destabilization caused Eisenhower to extend Truman’s policy of containment
to the Middle East and, in what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, his
administration successfully orchestrated passage of a Joint Resolution to Promote Peace
and Stability in the Middle East. This 1957 law authorized the president to cooperate
with any Middle Eastern nation to promote and maintain their national independence.
Economic programs and security/military assistance were authorized, as well as the
deployment of American forces to protect these nations from communist aggression.59
In what many considered to be gunboat diplomacy, Eisenhower used this Middle
East executive authority to keep the pro-Western King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan in
power. Although this new law gave the president broad authority, he still had to battle
Congress for support of his objectives in Jordan. During a telephone call in early 1957,
Eisenhower discussed the negative impact on his Jordan policy, one that resulted from
cuts in the State Department budget by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Secretary
of State Dulles countered that the president was constitutionally responsible for foreign
policy, and that the Senate had made it impossible for the president to carry out his
foreign policies in Jordan.60 When a comparable effort failed in Syria, Syria and Egypt
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responded to America’s meddling by forming a pact – the United Arab Republic – with
Soviet backing.
Eisenhower did succeed in preserving another Western-leaning government when
he sent troops to Lebanon during the summer of 1958. A telegram from the American
ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, demonstrates the challenges of coordinating
America’s diplomatic and military elements of national power. As the American troops
arrived, McClintock was trying to get the Lebanese army to maintain security in hopes
that a civil war could be prevented, and left-leaning Arab nationalists held at bay. The
ambassador’s task was complicated because the military had provided very little
information about their arrival in the country. Meanwhile Lebanese army commander
General Fouad Chehab was shocked to learn from McClintock that marines would soon
be in the country. Chehab told the ambassador that he needed time to convince his army
to support the Americans. “We are on the brink of catastrophe," he pleaded. "There is a
very thin chance we can avoid going over that brink provided your soldiers stay on board
their ships.” McClintock agreed with the Lebanese commander but was unable to get a
message to the invasion force.61 The Marines came ashore the day before Chehab could
speak with his army but, luckily, Lebanon remained aligned with the West. Nevertheless,
the Eisenhower Doctrine did not achieve all of its desired results. The goodwill
Eisenhower gained when he forced England and France to leave the Suez Canal was
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offset by his gunboat diplomacy, which generated resentment and increased Arab
nationalism. The Soviets used this resentment to extend their influence in the region.62
While Eisenhower sought approval for his Middle East doctrine, the Soviets
successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and placed a satellite in orbit
around earth. Sputnik caused much anxiety in the American public. A White House
study noted the consequent blow to American international prestige, citing several
instances in which foreign governments might see the clear Soviet advantage in ballistic
missile and space technologies as reason enough to act against American interests.63 This
anxiety resulted in major pressure on the administration to increase defense and weapons
production in order to catch up to a perceived Soviet lead in strategic weapons, and
worked against Eisenhower’s pursuit of mutual disarmament.64
Coupled by the perceived Soviet strategic weapons superiority, Eisenhower's
actions in Lebanon caused a response by the Communist Chinese, who resumed attacks
on Quemoy, and blockaded the island.65 During a planning conference on this crisis, the
president determined that an attack on Quemoy was equivalent to an attack on Formosa
itself., citing the Formosa Resolution. Eisenhower also decided that any United States
military action to defend Formosa must include the use of atomic weapons on mainland
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China. The president considered Quemoy and other outlying islands to be militarily
insignificant but judged their worth in terms of moral rather than military factors.66
With United States marines still in Lebanon, the president ordered the military to
prepare for conventional and nuclear war against China. American military assistance to
Nationalist Chinese helped them cope with the blockade. Dulles also issued a strongly
worded statement that indicated the United States might use nuclear weapons if necessary
to defend Quemoy if it was invaded. Even though Eisenhower did not invoke the
Formosa Resolution, which authorized him to use any force necessary to defend the
Nationalist Chinese islands, China’s hopes for lack of American resolve ended with the
secretary of state’s warnings. The Chinese called for talks to settle the dispute, but
continued their blockade. Playing on the perceived strategic weapons gap between the
United States and the Soviets, they coordinated with Moscow and arranged for the
Soviets to send a message to the United States. That message stated that any attack on
the Chinese People’s Republic was an attack on the Soviet Union. However, American
assistance enabled the Nationalists to break the Communist Chinese blockade of
Quemoy. Ceasefire agreements followed and the crisis eventually subsided. On the one
hand, Eisenhower’s foreign policy again contained communist expansion. On the other,
his latest threat of nuclear retaliation had drawn a counter-threat from a peer power. No
longer would America be able to threaten without an equally great risk to itself.67
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Elsewhere, Eisenhower’s foreign policy efforts struggled. His emphasis on
asymmetric methods suffered a setback when a CIA plot to replace Indonesian leader
Sukarno failed. The CIA perceived that Sukarno was leaning towards the Soviet and
Communist Chinese spheres of influence and orchestrated a coup to remove him. The
coup failed when Lawrence Allen Pope, a CIA pilot, was shot down by the Indonesians
in May 1958. Jailed and sentenced to death as a mercenary by the Indonesians, Pope was
evidence of U.S. involvement in the failed coup, even though the Eisenhower
administration maintained that he was a mercenary. The misinformation worked; even
after Pope's release in late 1962, American newspapers still referred to him as a soldier
for hire. One story dismissed his bombing of Indonesian forces as “the hazard and the
romance of flying for hire in the Orient.”68 Instead of executing Pope, Sukarno used his
captivity to leverage military assistance from the very nation that had sought his
overthrow.69
The fallout from this failed coup created a rift between Eisenhower and CIA
Director Allen Dulles. The president began to shut out Dulles, formerly one of his key
policy advisors, from planning sessions.70 The National Security Council meetings
leading up to Pope’s capture provide some insight as to why this incident may have led to
Eisenhower’s ire for the CIA Director. During several discussions of the Indonesian civil
war, Allen Dulles had commented on the rebels' need for military aircraft. During one
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NSC meeting, the president questioned the utility of providing airplanes to the rebels,
who were operating in thick jungle terrain. Director Dulles argued that airplanes could
be used to attack Sukarno’s forces on the few roads in the area, but Eisenhower remained
unconvinced that a few aircraft would significantly help the situation. The president did
feel that if a Communist takeover occurred in Indonesia, the United States would have to
intervene militarily, but Pope’s capture scuttled his plans. That the CIA pilot was
captured flying a plane that Eisenhower thought unnecessary surely contributed to the
personal rift with his CIA director.71
In late 1958, President Eisenhower’s policy collided with the Soviets when
Khrushchev demanded that the West cede control of West Germany’s Berlin access to
East Germany. Khrushchev gave the West six months. Advisors urged the president to
build up conventional forces in Europe in preparation for the defense of West Berlin, but
Eisenhower refused. Secretary of State Dulles did acknowledge that America was ready
to negotiate, but added that giving up West Berlin was not an option; a response that
hinted at nuclear retaliation for any Soviet aggression. The standoff ended with both
sides agreeing and to hold a peace summit, preceded by mutual visits. Khrushchev’s
subsequent visit to Camp David was hailed by the public as a great success, easing
tensions between the Soviets and America, bringing hopeful expectations for the
upcoming Paris peace summit.72 Eisenhower’s nuclear deterrence succeeded again, only
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this time not as an overt threat but simply because the capability was there. The Soviets
did not want to test Eisenhower’s resolve.
The Paris Peace Conference was anything but peaceful. Two weeks before the
conference began, the Soviets shot down a CIA U-2 spy plane over their territory.
Eisenhower’s administration initially denied that the aircraft was on a spying mission, but
soon accepted responsibility. At the conference, the president agreed to suspend U-2
flights over Soviet territory -- not much of a concession, as he had known for two years
that American spy satellites would soon be operational.73 More infuriating to
Khrushchev, Eisenhower he refused to apologize for the spy flight. Fallout in other
nations from the U-2 incident dogged the president’s administration. Pakistan had
provided bases for the American spy-plane missions into Russia on the condition that
they remain secret, and a Pakistani diplomat was most displeased that the free American
press had published maps showing the location of a U-2 base in his country.74 The
opportunity for nuclear arms reduction and cooperation between the East and West was
lost when the Soviets downed pilot Francis Gary Powers’ spy plane.
Military friction between America and the USSR increased after the U-2 was
downed over Soviet territory. One incident a few months later resulted in the capture of
two additional American pilots. The Russians attacked an American RB-47H spy plane
operating in international airspace, bringing it down in waters outside of Soviet territory.
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Most of the crew were killed, but the Soviets captured two surviving pilots. The fact that
the RB-47H was operating in an international area caused Eisenhower to consider direct
retaliation to secure the release of the surviving crewmen. The plan called for blocking
Soviet air and maritime travel to United States and the deliberate downing of any Soviet
military aircraft that flew within thirty miles of any United States territory.75
The tense relations between the Soviets and America were not the only issues
Eisenhower faced. The geopolitical environment remained an active challenge
throughout Eisenhower’s presidency and, during his final year in office, he severed
relations with Cuba. Castro’s successful coup, which ousted the American-backed Cuban
dictator Fulgencio Batista, jeopardized United States’ control of Guantanamo Bay and
deprived many American businessmen from their holdings in Cuba. Most troublesome
was Castro’s trade agreement with the Soviet Union. These developments put in motion
a CIA plan to overthrow the Marxist leader of the island nation.76
The prior administration's influence was also significant. Eisenhower had
inherited Containment and with it the Korean police action from Truman, but the Truman
administration’s NSC-68 (April 1950) yielded far-reaching ramifications, too. It
reinforced Containment as the overarching foreign policy by calling for a dramatic
increase in military funding; by 1953, Eisenhower’s first year in office, defense spending
tripled.77 Having inherited both hot and cold wars against the spread of communism,
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Eisenhower also intended to save the American economy by reducing military spending.
He was passionate about bringing a change in the international climate that allowed for a
universal arms reduction and feared costly war preparedness as much as he feared all-out
war itself. In his 1953 “Chance for Peace” speech to the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, Eisenhower warned that “[t]his world in arms is not spending money alone. It is
spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.”78
Yet two years into his presidency, the international climate compelled him to continue
spending the bulk of America’s national income on defense. Eisenhower’s comments to
Congress on the fiscal year 1954 budget noted that about seventy-three percent of the
budget was to be spent on six major national security programs.79 Only after a years long
effort did his administration succeed in lowering annual defense spending. By the last
year of his second term of office, he had prevailed upon Congress to cut defense spending
by nearly twenty percent. When he left office in 1961, just under fifty-one percent of the
budget was going towards national security.80
Eisenhower mostly benefited from the political support of Congress during his
first two years in office, mostly because his party controlled both the House and Senate of
the 83rd Congress, if only by a slim margin. After two years in office, the support of his
party decreased as the 84th and 85th Congresses both saw Democratic majorities in both
houses. It was the 84th Congress, backed by cotton industry lobbyists, that directly
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contributed to the Suez Canal Incident.81 During his last two years as president, the
Democrats overwhelmingly controlled the 86th Congress. But while opposition gains
generally meant less support in Congress, the decrease was less than catastrophic. In
1953, Eisenhower policies enjoyed a nearly ninety percent success-rate in Congress; by
1960 his administration was still winning on sixty-five percent of the votes.82
But despite a Republican majority his first two years in office, Eisenhower did
have to contend with a serious challenge from Senator John W. Bricker (R-OH), who
attempted a Constitutional amendment. Bricker intended to limit the presidential role in
foreign affairs by giving Congress the power "to regulate all executive agreements with
any foreign power or international organization." Eisenhower’s administration spent over
a year fighting this amendment, eventually managing to overcome its passage by only
one vote in the Senate.83 Congressional pressure continued, though. For the remainder
of his presidency, Congress worked against Eisenhower’s efforts to reduce the defense
budget. In late 1957, the Gaither Report reached the American public. It stated that the
Soviets would be able to launch a devastating nuclear attack against America in a few
years, and recommended a huge military effort patterned on NSC-68 that called for
massive defense spending.84 Reports of the gap between Soviet and American
intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities credited the Soviets with an advantage,
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causing Congress to agitate for more defense spending. As newspapers across America
warned of Soviet dominance, Democratic Senators John S. Clark and Joseph C.
O’Mahoney assailed the president for keeping the truth from the American public.
O’Mahoney further stated that the report might be proof that Eisenhower was not capable
of performing his duties.85
Adding to Gaither’s report was a New York Herald article by Joseph Alsop
charging Eisenhower with misleading the nation while the Soviets increased the missile
gap and gained an unmatched nuclear strike capability. Alsop, a prominent columist who
took credit for coining the term "Domino theory," had a large readership, but also his
own troubles. While he was in Moscow to interview Premier Khrushchev, Alsop had
fallen prey to a Russian “Honey Trap” set by KGB agents who had photographed him in
the midst of a sexual encounter with a young man. The Soviets failed to turn Alsop into a
spy, but this encounter compromised his lifestyle, and his homosexuality became the
subject of considerable domestic and international intrigue.86 Despite the resulting
credibility problem, the Democratic majority in Congress used Alsop’s “Missile Gap”
article to allocate a billion dollars more than the president wanted to spend on missiles
and long-range bombers.87 The president’s message in the Fiscal Year 1959 budget
reflects his displeasure at the extra spending, and he concluded it with a call for
cooperation.
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Our response must rise above personal selfishness, above sectional interests,
above political partisanship. The goal of lasting peace with justice, difficult
though it may be to achieve, is worth all of our efforts. We must make the
necessary sacrifices to attain it. Our own people demand it and the nations of the
world look to us for leadership.88
When signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1959, Eisenhower was
more pointed, stating that, "…in addition to appropriating over $1 billion more than I
consider necessary for our security, [Congress] has placed mandatory minimum strengths
on the reserve components of the Army. This is an action which seriously disturbs me
and which represents an unprecedented departure from past policy.”89
Congressional elections influenced Eisenhower’s foreign policy as well, for with
each subsequent election the Democrats gained majorities in both the House and Senate.
This opposition party majority made it harder and harder for Eisenhower to gain support
for his foreign policy, even though his presidency remained secure. Meanwhile, Vice
President Nixon successfully carried the burden of campaigning for the president, as
Eisenhower was sick for prolonged periods during the 1956 reelection.90 In the months
leading up to the general election, the Suez Canal incident saw a seriously ill Eisenhower
fighting through his ailments while managing this crisis. And when his son John
counseled the president not to offend Jewish voters by taking actions against Israel, the
president responded that he did not care about the election. He also wanted to ensure that
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world leaders clearly understood that the American election was not a factor in his
response to the Suez crisis.91
Lyndon Baines Johnson’s presidential aspirations also pressured the Eisenhower
administration to catch up to the Soviets in the space race. Seeking the Democratic
nomination for the 1960 presidential election, Johnson used the national concern caused
by the Soviet satellite Sputnik to publicly agitate for the creation of an federal agency for
the development of space capabilities. Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Act partly because of Johnson’s bid for the presidency.92
Establishing NASA created its own set of problems for Eisenhower. The military wanted
control, and he spent much effort containing the military’s angst when the new space
agency became a civilian operation. Some of the friction generated by the new space
agency surfaced in a meeting of the National Security Council, where the military
repeatedly pressed Eisenhower to change the language in a directive in order to give the
military more control over the development of space weaponry.93
The crew of the downed RB-47H also played into the 1960 presidential election
because the Soviets prevented Eisenhower from obtaining their freedom while he was
still in office. Premier Khrushchev discussed the significance of these captured aviators
with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson prior to the elections, implying that it would be
problematic for the presidential candidates if the Soviets were to hold a public trial before
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the election. The Soviet leader also said it would be against the policies of his
government to free the airmen before the American presidential election. Ambassador
Thompson believed that Khrushchev intended to “gift” the pilots to whomever became
the next president either to improve world perception of the Soviets or gain bargaining
leverage with the new administration.94
Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy blasted Eisenhower’s foreign policy
during the election campaign, capitalizing on the perception that Eisenhower had allowed
America to fall behind the Soviets in the arms and space race. Kennedy also criticized
the president for failing to prevent the rise of Fidel Castro in nearby Cuba. While
campaigning in Tampa, Kennedy also accused Vice President Nixon of failure in his role
as Eisenhower’s personal emissary to Latin America. Kennedy went on to outline his
plan to improve Latin American relations, including relations with Cuba.95 Kennedy’s
campaign also faulted Eisenhower for the loss of the U-2 spy plane, the failed Soviet
Peace Summit, unfavorable developments in a newly independent Congo, and many
other foreign policy problems during Eisenhower’s watch. While the world viewed this
public debate, the constraints of term limits applied pressure and Eisenhower’s window
of effectiveness for foreign policy closed.96
The public mood played a major factor in President Eisenhower’s foreign policy,
too. Throughout his presidency, he battled the public’s clamor for change – a clamor that
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alternately inhibited and shaped his plans. A persistent charge against his policies,
carried out in the court of public opinion, was that the "Missile Gap" was real.
Eisenhower knew that the Soviets were not ahead in nuclear delivery capability because
of the CIA’s U-2 spy plane flights over Soviet territories.97 He truly feared nuclear war;
during a 1956 White House conference on nuclear fissionable materials planning,
Eisenhower was emphatic in his belief that the public was concerned over the effects of
nuclear radiation and the other consequences of a nuclear war. The president wanted to
limit the production of military nuclear materials and slow or cancel atomic weapons
testing.98
Despite his concerns and his desire to slow the growth of the military,
Eisenhower’s administration presided over a dramatic increase in American nuclear
weapons capability. The missile gap became a political tool used against Eisenhower,
and it originated from worst-case scenario intelligence estimates that assumed the Soviets
would do everything they were technologically capable of doing. Error, resource
constraints, and Soviet consideration of U.S. countermeasures were not factored in.99
Available intelligence had already verified that the worst-case assumption was
unrealistic, but this perception resulted in more strategic weapons development and
growth. From 1958 to 1961, the U.S. nuclear arsenal increased from six thousand to
eighteen thousand nuclear weapons. Worse yet, the build-up only heightened public
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anxiety. As both sides developed more atomic weapons, fears of nuclear war became a
fact of public life. Organizations supported by celebrities rallied for control of nuclear
power. News of Japanese fishermen poisoned by radioactive fallout, and Nevil Shute’s
book On the Beach, which was later made into a movie, caused many to fear that
Eisenhower’s reliance on nuclear retaliation would bring about the end of the world.100
Secretary of State Dulles’ interview in Life Magazine also resulted in a re-branding of
Eisenhower’s New Look policy. Dulles’ comments about the president bluffing with
nukes to prevent war with China caused backlash both at home and abroad. As the
wisdom of Massive Retaliation was questioned, critics argued for an increase in
conventional capability to offset its all or nothing approach. To appease the critics,
Eisenhower modified his policy to accommodate more flexible responses.101 His
successor would expand on this flexibility.
As Eisenhower’s public approval ratings began to slip in his second term, heart
and intestinal problems also plagued him. Some ailments caused lengthy hospitalization
at crucial times, including a six-week recovery from a heart attack in late 1955 and a
1956 bowel obstruction surgery. Even when not hospitalized, bouts of illness would
incapacitate the president for long stretches of time. That he often worked himself to
exhaustion only made temporarily debilitating illnesses more likely. Eisenhower coped
with these chronic conditions with alcohol and sleeping pills.102 Adding to the burden of
poor health was the loss of Eisenhower’s key advisors and prominent positions in his
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administration. John Foster Dulles became ill, resigned, and later passed away. National
Security Advisor Robert Cutler also left. The schism between CIA director Allen Dulles
grew in the aftermath of the U-2 downing and the failed Indonesia coup and, by that time,
the president was on his third secretary of defense. The combination of poor health,
changes in key administration members, and declining public opinion caused some to
attack his presidency. Harper’s Magazine called for Eisenhower to resign, referring to
his administration as, “A leaky ship with a committee on the bridge and a crippled
captain giving orders from sickbay.”103
This discussion of Eisenhower does not touch on every aspect of his
administration’s foreign policy. It does, however, address most major policy issues
during both his terms in office. Viewed from the perspective of GPACED, these major
issues compelled Eisenhower to take certain actions and avoid others.
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The president had to take these actions even when they interfered with his goals.

Figure 3. Visualization of the impact of GPACED on the Eisenhower administration
The geopolitical situation and Congress mattered most, compelling Eisenhower's
administration to take actions not of his own choosing almost two-thirds of the time.
That pattern of unwelcome GPACED influence would continue to develop during
Kennedy's presidency.
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CHAPTER IV

KENNEDY

The analysis of John F. Kennedy's administration begins with a look at his foreign
policy role. Unlike his predecessor, JFK had very limited experience in foreign policy,
strategic level leadership, or as an executive. An ambitious politician elected to the
House of Representatives in 1946, Kennedy served there until elected to the Senate. As a
senator from 1953-1960, he became interested in foreign policy and acquired some
experience, but only served on domestic committees.104 Once in the White House, his
most trusted advisors were National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, his brother,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and his speechwriter, Theodore Sorenson. His
expanded group of senior advisors included Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Taylor.105
Bundy had been a Harvard dean, an experienced foreign policy expert who had
worked on the Marshall Plan with Henry Stimson and Dean Acheson. He was a capable
yet arrogant man who confidently managed Kennedy’s loose organization. Rusk had
served the Truman administration as an assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs
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but despite that experience frequently deferred to Kennedy while serving as secretary of
state, sometimes abdicating his own responsibilities. In contrast to Bundy, Rusk was a
quiet personality who only intended to serve at the pleasure of the president. McNamara,
former president of Ford Motor Company who had helped modernize the iconic
automaker, brought a businessman’s perspective to the Department of Defense. Attorney
General Robert Kennedy occasionally stepped outside of that role, helping to solve
problems in other areas when the president ran into roadblocks. Taylor was a career
army officer who came out of retirement to join Kennedy’s administration after the Bay
of Pigs operation had failed. Initially an advisor, he moved on to serve as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1964. Small groups of inexperienced but talented and
highly intelligent special advisors rounded out JFK's foreign policy term. Twenty-nineyear-old Latin America specialist Richard N. Goodwin was typical of Kennedy’s young
staffers. Lacking a background in his assigned area at first, he quickly became an expert
and thrived in Kennedy’s loosely organized and flexible system.106
The key people throughout JFK's administration all shared a common trait: they
were all chosen for their hardline anti-communist beliefs because Kennedy intended to
launch a crusade against communism.107 Using these advisors, Kennedy organized his
foreign policy-making apparatus to suit his leadership style and goals -- goals that
Eisenhower's more bureaucratic NSC had not always achieved. He also shared a popular
perception that the Department of State was too cautious, too slow, and too large,
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referring to it as a "bowl of jelly." Kennedy preferred to run foreign policy in the White
House "by seminar" using that small, intelligent-but-inexperienced staff of his.108 The
president’s refusal to employ the more formal NSC processes from the previous
administration is evident in his letter to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson delegating the
president's NSC chairing duties to the vice president.109 After the Bay of Pigs incident,
JFK moved National Security Advisor Bundy into the White House, where Bundy was to
establish the NSC in the basement of the West Wing and set up a situation room that
allowed for secure communications. These new spaces in the White House gained Bundy
greater access to international affairs; he and his staffers took over many of the State
Department's foreign policy duties. This arrangement and Secretary of State Rusk’s
accommodating personality thus allowed Kennedy to function as his own secretary of
state.110
President Kennedy's freewheeling planning and policy development structure left
him at the center of decision making, but the system drew criticism as disorderly, chaotic,
and prone to leaving key people uninformed and actions incomplete. In addition to
usurping the State Department’s lead role in foreign affairs, these changes caused a rift in
civil-military relations as the services became shut out of high-level planning.111 For
example, the Kennedy administration failed to remove outdated nuclear-armed Jupiter
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missile systems from Turkey even though removal of the missiles had been discussed on
several occasions prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In an August 1962 meeting between
Kennedy and his key foreign policy advisors, the president discussed contingency
planning for Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Cuba. That meeting included a
discussion of European-based American missile sites, specifically, that the Jupiter
missiles in Turkey were useless, but they would be diplomatically problematic with the
Turks. Kennedy directed that they be removed, but they remained in Turkey, becoming a
significant factor during the height of the Cuban missile crisis.112 Kennedy was furious
to discover that his orders had not been carried out, but the disorganized planning
environment was largely to blame, and would be again.113 Even so, America's youngest
elected president's reliance on similarly youthful foreign policy advisors is not surprising.
Kennedy’s New Frontier campaign included a promise to block the threat of
communism where the previous administration had failed. Evoking campaign rhetoric
that criticized Eisenhower’s Massive Retaliation policy, Kennedy’s "Flexible Response"
aimed at present and emerging threats instead of reacting defensively after they had
become a problem. This policy permitted America to deal with all types of threats,
containing global communism with military and/or economic pressure. His policies
called for a buildup of conventional capabilities, a closing of the perceived missile gap
with the Soviets, the development of a range of counterinsurgency capabilities, expanded
foreign aid programs, civil defense to help Americans deal with the results of a nuclear
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war, and diplomacy that leveraged the United Nations. The U.S. Army Special Forces, or
"Green Berets," and the Peace Corps resulted from Kennedy’s goals and belonged to a
foreign policy that was very much an extension of Truman’s Containment.114
The youth and inexperience of Kennedy's foreign policy team was a disadvantage
made worse by his purging of more experienced key personnel, especially at the State
Department, where his young staff alienated many of the old hands with its pompous
attitude.115 His reorganization of the national security planning apparatus built under
Eisenhower also isolated his policymaking team from the subject matter expertise and
judgment of veteran policymakers. The resulting loss of useful insight left Kennedy’s
foreign policy apparatus unprepared for challenges that the geopolitical environment
would present.
Two weeks before Kennedy took office, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had
given a speech at Moscow's Institute of Marxism-Leninism that redefined peaceful
coexistence by promising to support wars of national liberation. According to California
newspaper columnist Stanley Johnson, who covered the speech, the Soviet premier
warned that war would come if the capitalist nations resisted communism’s victories, and
that the fertile fields for communist awakenings in Asia had doomed the forces of
imperialism. The world, he said, could not allow those doomed forces to drag millions
into the grave.116 One such war of liberation was underway in Laos, where Kennedy had
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his first opportunity to employ the Flexible Response strategy. In 1958, Eisenhower’s
administration had used the CIA and foreign aid to maintain a pro-Western government
in Laos but, in 1960, Laotian nationalists had threatened this government. One such
group was the Pathet Lao, a former World War II communist resistance group. With
backing from the Soviets and North Vietnam, they and other nationalists had briefly
gained control of the country before loyalist forces pushed them out. The Pathet Lao
were again threatening the loyalist government when Kennedy took office. For anticommunists like JFK, Laos was one of the “dominoes” of the region; if it fell to
communism, the assumption was that all of Southeast Asia would fall as well. Laos was
a major concern that Eisenhower had shared with Kennedy during his transition brief.
According to Eisenhower, “[i]f Laos [was] lost to the Free World, in the long run we will
lose all of Southeast Asia.”117
Kennedy used the CIA, and economic assistance to build up the loyalists while
U.S. military advisors trained and equipped a twenty-five-thousand-man army to defend
the government. However, these efforts did not prevent the civil war from widening.
With backing from North Vietnam the Pathet Lao gained ground, seizing key
infrastructure from the government including the last operational airfield. While the
loyalists were losing ground, Kennedy had to contend with the fallout from the failed
CIA-orchestrated coup in Cuba. The president called for a Laotian ceasefire, while at the
same time ordering hundreds of American servicemen in Laos to demonstrate American
resolve in the region by openly wearing their uniforms. The communists were on the
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verge of victory, and the Government of Laos was militarily incapable of preventing
Soviet-equipped rebels from seizing power. National Security Advisor Bundy knew it,
and warned the president that the Laotian government force “has no stomach and no real
capability…development of their confidence and capabilities is going to require a period
of years, if it can be done at all.”118 Kennedy moved more American military advisors to
the region and even considered intervening with American combat units to defend the
Loyalist government, before opting instead to let diplomacy to play out. The resulting
arrangement was less than ideal: it called for a permanent end to the fighting, but made
Laos a neutral country ruled by a coalition of all the warring parties. In that coalition the
communists had the most representation while the Soviet-equipped Pathet Lao held the
strongest military capability and more than two-thirds of the country.119
Kennedy’s flexible response fell short of its goals in Laos. Although he did end
the fighting, he did not preserve a pro-Western government or block any domino-like
communist expansion. The large communist presence not only remained but, despite the
neutrality agreement, maintained its ties with the North Vietnamese and the Soviets.
That this Southeast Asian foreign policy problem had been forced on JFK is clear by the
tone of a letter to the president from advisor Chester Bowles, who was preparing a speech
for Kennedy on the Laotian settlement. In this letter, Bowles provided some policy
guidance, pointing out that American foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia were no
more sophisticated than Eisenhower's had been. The government, according to Bowles,
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had simply been reacting to military situations with no clear objective in mind and had
therefore ceded the initiative to global communist forces.120
Elsewhere, in a bid to improve poor third-world conditions that allowed
communism to grow, Kennedy's administration started the Peace Corps program.
American teachers, medical professionals, agricultural experts, and engineers traveled to
Latin America and Africa to aid in social and economic development. Kennedy also
pushed his Alliance for Progress program: a scheme targeting Latin America with
monetary grants to help improve economic conditions. But neither the Peace Corps nor
the Alliance for Progress made communist takeovers any less likely, despite the presence
of nearly five thousand Americans. The people they helped showed little interest in
American ideals and, two billion dollars later, the Alliance for Progress also failed to
achieve its goals.121 A Missouri newspaper editorial captured some of the problems that
the Alliance for Progress struggled to overcome, and called on Congress to do something
about the grotesque situation in which millions of dollars were being demanded for Latin
American governments. The author also questioned the wisdom of having a virulent anticapitalist, anti-American Argentinean economist on America’s payroll as part of the
Alliance for Progress plan.122 Lack of funding, corruption, distrust of American
interventionism, and cultural differences prevented the sought-after reforms from taking
place.
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Meanwhile, Germany was once again becoming an international flashpoint. The
Soviets and East Germans were losing manpower and intellectual capacity to the West
through a steady flow of refugees from the communist satellite German Democratic
Republic. Their escape route was through West Berlin and, during the June 1961 Vienna
Summit, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave the Western powers six months to
leave. Talks in the following days produced no agreement, and Kennedy ultimately
responded to the Berlin ultimatum by taking a similarly aggressive stance. Not only
would he order the deployment of more forces to Europe, but he addressed Congress
personally, asking for a three billion dollar hike in the defense budget, an increase in the
authorized size of the U.S. military, and a reserve call-up.123 Congressional approval of
those requests -- and of JFK's resolve -- caused the Soviets to stem the flow of refugees
into West Berlin another way. In August 1961, construction began on the Berlin Wall,
and the six-month ultimatum passed without further incident.
The greatest challenge Kennedy faced was the Cuban Missile Crisis. In August
1962, U-2 spy flights detected Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction in Cuba,
and the president formed a special advisory group from the National Security Council to
plan a response. The Executive Committee of the NSC, known as Ex Comm, provided
the core planning group, its most frequent members being Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Joint Chiefs
Chairman Taylor, National Security Advisor Bundy, Air Force Chief of Staff General
Curtis LeMay, speechwriter Sorensen, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. UN
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Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and former ambassadors to the Soviet Union Charles
Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson occasionally joined the Ex Comm. This group
provided the president with response options, but notes from Ex Comm meetings
describe how difficult it was to obtain intelligence now that Soviet air defenses had
improved. Meanwhile, the construction of the missile sites accelerated.124
The urgent need for aerial reconnaissance that would not spark combat with the
Cubans found Ex Comm planners literally struggling over wet paint. One scheme called
for the flights to be conducted by the United Nations so that Cubans would not fire on
neutral aircraft. However, only the American aircraft were equipped for certain missions,
meaning that UN insignia would have to be painted on one or more U.S. aircraft. The
plan was delayed because the paint would not have enough time to dry before the flight,
and no one wanted peeling paint to reveal an American star and bar.125
Kennedy demanded removal of the missiles anyway, and ordered preparations for
an invasion of Cuba, along with a naval blockade that president’s administration
diplomatically referred to as a “Quarantine” because a blockade is an act of war. The
Soviets challenged the quarantine at first, and the two powers came close to war.
Meanwhile, some Ex Comm members, led by General LeMay, advised an invasion of
Cuba even if the Soviets removed the missiles. A confrontation was averted with
assistance from United Nations Secretary General U Thant, who helped reach an
agreement that allowed the Soviets to remove the missiles in exchange for American
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promises not to invade Cuba. In a triumph of backchannel diplomacy, Kennedy’s
administration also concluded a secret agreement to remove the obsolete nuclear-tipped
Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Flexible response worked in this crisis, although Kennedy
drew criticism for bringing the world closer to nuclear war than Eisenhower era nuclear
brinksmanship ever had.126 But the Soviets did remove their nuclear weapons from
Cuba.
Kennedy’s flexible response was also successful in eliminating a perceived threat
in British Guiana. His administration judged that the popularly elected prime minister of
British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan, was a leftist moving the country towards communism.
British Guiana was scheduled for independence from Great Britain after Jagan’s August
1961 election, and American analysts feared that he would turn the country into a
communist satellite once free of British rule. A memo from the Special Assistant to the
President, Arthur Schlesinger, outlined the basic course the administration should take
against Jagan: (1) Use the two years before the country’s independence to bring Jagan
into the Western sphere of influence while establishing covert operations to counter the
communist threats in the country. (2) Remove Jagan if he did not align with the West.127
The covert operations soon took precedence over trying to win Jagan’s loyalty.
Using clandestine CIA-manufactured unrest, Kennedy’s administration pressured the
British to declare Jagan’s leadership as failing, citing the CIA-orchestrated civil disorders
as evidence -- social unrest that helped Jagan’s political opponents beat him in the next
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election.128 The asymmetrical subterfuge and political pressure on an ally, which strained
Anglo-American relations, successfully installed a Kennedy-approved government in
British Guiana.
Vietnam was Kennedy’s last major foreign policy challenge. His administration
inherited Eisenhower's commitment to protect South Vietnam under SEATO's terms and,
like Eisenhower, he supported South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem with economic
and military aid and military advisors. Unlike Eisenhower, JFK significantly increased
the presence of American military personnel in South Vietnam, and the supply of modern
combat equipment and ammunition to Diem’s Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). Also in keeping with the flexible response strategy, he employed U.S. Special
Forces in counterinsurgency operations such as the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Much energy went into The Strategic Hamlet concept. This creation of fortified
government-controlled villages as a bulwark against National Liberation Front (NLF)
insurgents was based on a successful strategy employed by the British during the
Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). Key to the success of these villages was the support
of the South Vietnamese government (GVN) and effective establishment of the
individual hamlets, but the Diem government rushed the process, leaving them
inadequately prepared and incapable of repelling communist guerrilla attacks. Diem was
also unable to compel his provincial leaders to use all strategic hamlet resources for their
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intended purpose. The result was an inconsistent, ineffectual program that demonstrated
Diem's inability to protect his population from the Viet Cong.129
A report prepared for General Taylor described Ngo Dinh Diem’s government as
administratively paralyzed, visibly deteriorating, and crippled by intrigue, nepotism, and
corruption. The report concluded that only a drastic change at the top of the government
could create conditions for improvement and that Diem’s leadership was part of the
problem.130 Kennedy’s administration thus encouraged a coup to replace Diem, which
resulted in his murder. The president did have reservations about becoming militarily
engaged in Vietnam but, as an ardent believer in the domino theory, was determined to
keep South Vietnam and the surrounding region out of communist hands. That
determination can best be measured by his commitment of American forces. Eisenhower
had one thousand advisors in Vietnam when Kennedy took office, but by the time of
Kennedy’s assassination, there were seventeen thousand in the country.131
At the Vienna Summit on June 4, 1961, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev and
Kennedy were discussing the Berlin Crisis, Khruschev also questioned U.S.
commitments in Laos. Kennedy responded that those obligations and commitments had
been undertaken before he had assumed office, a statement that attests to the influence of
prior administrations on foreign policy.132 Eisenhower had left Kennedy with what
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Truman had left him and, although Kennedy advertised his Flexible Response policy as a
departure from Eisenhower's New Look, it was also a form of Containment. More to the
point, it increased military expenditures by thirteen percent despite his efforts to distance
America from reliance on nuclear weapons. Although Kennedy inherited a smaller
military than he wanted, he nevertheless used force to support foreign policy at a far
greater rate than any Cold War president to date.133
The Eisenhower administration had also avoided treaties that included firm
military commitments, but Kennedy nevertheless used SEATO to justify a greater
involvement in the Republic of Vietnam’s fight against the North. This advice came
from Military Representative to the President General Maxwell Taylor. Upon his return
from a Southeast Asia assessment tour, Taylor reported that intervention under a liberal
interpretation of SEATO's terms might be the best way to save South Vietnam.
It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide
how it will cope with Khrushchev’s “wars of liberation” which are really parewars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique
which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final
answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may
come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to
attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the
Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is
commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south.134
Eisenhower also left Kennedy with a CIA plan to remove Castro from power in
Cuba. Kennedy did authorize the invasion that resulted in the Bay of Pigs debacle, but
the counsel of experts who had planned the coup and the sheer bureaucratic momentum
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of a plan already set in motion was difficult to resist. The new administration’s looseplanning organization and JFK's disdain for the previous president’s formal planning
process contributed to his giving the go-ahead even though National Security Advisor
Bundy had cautioned him that the State Department, Department of Defense, and CIA
were at odds about whether a force composed of Cuban dissidents could topple Castro’s
regime. The Defense Department and the CIA were enthusiastic about the chances for
success, while the State Department held that no invasion should take place without
careful diplomatic preparations.135 Assurances that a coup could not be linked to
America or his administration even if it failed also factored in, but the official denials that
followed the Bay of Pigs failure only made America look worse when the truth came to
light. Kennedy ultimately accepted responsibility.
General Taylor’s Bay of Pigs investigation shed light on how this secret mission
had progressed from Eisenhower’s March 17, 1960 four point authorization for Castro’s
removal to Kennedy’s April 4, 1961 approval of the invasion. Eisenhower had
authorized (a) the creation of a political opposition, (b) mass communications to the
Cuban people, (c) covert intelligence and action originating inside Cuba, and (d) the
building of an adequate paramilitary force with a cadre of leaders outside of Cuba. By
December 1960, this paramilitary concept had grown into a strike force even though
Colonel Jack L. Hawkins of the CIA could not identify the official policy change
authorizing it. Taylor further determined that preparations to train and equip a far more
conventional force -- much less paramilitary than originally conceived -- had been well
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underway by February 1961.136 In the breakdown of routine briefings and staff functions
that occurred during the transition period, it is easy to see how Kennedy authorized a plan
that he thought was Eisenhower’s even though it had morphed into something much
different. The resulting failure not only failed to remove Castro, but encouraged him to
charge the United States with Yankee imperialism and threaten to spread communism
throughout Latin America. In the end, Kennedy owned the outcome of what Eisenhower
had set in motion.137
Kennedy’s party controlled both the House and Senate of the 87th and 88th
Congresses, and his brief presidency enjoyed an overall success rate of eighty-six percent
in Congressional votes supporting administration policies.138 Unfortunately, that support
did not always result in foreign policy success; "softer" foreign policy programs like the
Food for Peace initiative, Alliance for Progress, and the Peace Corps did not achieve
meaningful results and many Americans viewed them as a waste of money. Worst of all,
the programs sometimes generated anti-American sentiment anyway. Part of the problem
was money -- Congress did not give Kennedy all of the funding he had requested.139
Soon after the Peace Corps was established, it became obvious that funding was a
problem. In a letter to Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver
asked Rusk to speak to Senator Fulbright about the amount of money needed for Peace
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Corps activities, saying it was a tragedy if the activities were smaller than those proposed
by the president.140 Had Congress provided full support, the Peace Corps and other such
initiatives might have produced better outcomes.
Congress also interfered with one of Kennedy’s efforts to establish closer ties
between India and the West. The previous administration had already enticed India with
economic aid packages and JFK intended to increase the amount of aid in hopes of
neutralizing Soviet influence. That influence had become significant by the 1960s; the
Soviets were now providing India’s military equipment, which complicated American
relations with Pakistan and made Kennedy’s push for congressionally funded economic
aid much more challenging. In 1962, Congress cut the president’s proposed India aid
package by twenty-five percent.141 Although Kennedy eventually got the full requested
amount authorized, Congress’s attempt to cut the funding pushed India even closer to the
Soviets.142
During the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets increased pressure on Kennedy’s
administration by announcing their intention to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapons
tests. The president responded by allowing the United States Strategic forces to conduct
their own nuclear tests, first underground, then above it. Nuclear arms negotiations
between the two countries eventually resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963,
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but the negotiations were complicated by a senate so divided that ratification was
uncertain. Ironically, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act of 1961 further
impeded Kennedy's ability to negotiate disarmament treaties even though he had
advocated for it during the campaign. This law mandated Congressional approval of
executive agreements by reaffirming the requirement of a two-thirds majority vote in the
Senate in order to discourage reliance on executive treaty agreements before they were
finalized. The nature of the secretive, compartmentalized negotiations exacerbated
divisions in Congress, making it difficult for the president’s representatives to present
approved options while negotiating with the Soviets.143 A memorandum to prepare
Kennedy for a meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss nuclear
test ban verification shows how his administration had to negotiate the treaty with
Congress as well as the Soviets. The memo describes the resistance of the Senate
Republicans, who approached the discussions from a partisan perspective.144
Kennedy's 1960 presidential race against Nixon had been hotly contested, and he
clearly factored elections into many of his executive decisions that followed. Timing was
also a problem -- he was campaigning in support of congressional elections when the
Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head. Distracted by campaigning, he only became aware
of the presence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in October 1962,
even though information on missile site construction had been leaked to the press in
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August over Kennedy's public denials.145 The leaked information caused concern among
some in the general public, especially as the missiles were nuclear-capable and the
August newspaper editorial criticizing the administration for downplaying the missile
sites was correspondingly blunt.146 Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone
held a discussion about these Soviet missile sites in Secretary of State Rusk’s office on
August 21, 1962. The intelligence reports noted the buildup of Soviet equipment on
Cuba and, although they could not verify the exact nature of construction, they noted that
the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was possible – “a critical and dynamic
situation.” The group discussed possible courses of action, including naval blockades,
should they discover nuclear arms in Cuba. Kennedy was not present during this
meeting.147
Reelection concerns also factored into Kennedy’s Vietnam policy during 1963,
when Congressional support for it and his other foreign policies began to waver. When
the media attacked him for supporting Ngo Dinh Diem during the June 1963 Buddhist
uprising, the president confided to a friend that only winning the war would confound the
press. In the short run, however, the televised image of a priest setting himself on fire did
more damage. When discussing the upcoming presidential election, Kennedy remarked
that he would not be able to get the American people to reelect him if he gave up
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Vietnam to the communists.148 And anti-communist campaign rhetoric was already a
proven winner by that point. Kennedy had chastised Eisenhower for allowing a
communist satellite at America's doorstep and vowed to remove Castro during his
campaign against Nixon -- a hard line stance had helped him win even though the Bay of
Pigs operation later turned out to be a fiasco.
Kennedy's campaign rhetoric also hastened his decision to accelerate American
strategic nuclear weapons capability. By increasing the number of U.S. intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) sevenfold and gaining a three-to-one advantage over the
Soviets, he kept his 1960 promise to close the "Missile Gap" even though he had proof
that the only such gap favored the Americans. Nor were the Soviets engaged in an
expansion of their strategic missile program, yet this missile gap controversy was playing
out in the national media by 1963. Two years before, Defense Secretary McNamara had
said that there was no missile gap, but Kennedy nevertheless directed National Security
Advisor Bundy to say, for political purposes, that there was one. Bundy's recommended
response split the difference, acknowledging that there was not a gap favoring the
Soviets, but left the definition of "gap" vague. Kennedy disapproved of Bundy's draft
and ordered a new one that helped "demonstrate that there was a military and intelligence
lag in the previous administration that started the missile gap."149
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The nuclear arms competition was a domestic issue as well. As America rushed
to keep up with the Soviets, worries of nuclear Armageddon, and fears of an out of
control military entered popular culture. Some popular movies fueled a sense that the
military was determined to use their nuclear arsenal. Seven Days in May and Dr.
Strangelove depicted reckless militaries taking over governments and starting atomic
wars. These worries undermined civil-military relations as Kennedy's new administration
challenged senior military leadership.150
The civil rights movement also affected foreign policy by adding anxiety to the
domestic atmosphere. Challenging the evils of communism was a struggle for U.S.
diplomats who could not reasonably justify legalized racism in the United States. Cuba’s
Castro often used race issues in America as propaganda against Kennedy and African
diplomats on official missions in the United States were refused service in racially
segregated areas. One incident that made the news was a Raleigh, North Carolina, hotel
restaurant's refusal to serve Liberian Ambassador to the United Nations, Angie Brooks.
The hotel manager's complaint -- that it was a political setup because Brooks had a
reporter and cameraman with her -- did not make the United States look any better, and
Liberia lodged a formal complaint.151 Kennedy merely suggested that visiting Africans
should try to avoid segregated areas, but he could not continue to ignore America's racial
tensions. As Martin Luther King and Medgar Evers rallied for equal rights in the face of
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southern politicians who continued to resist the civil rights movement, they pressured
Kennedy to support civil rights legislation.152
The friction of impending nuclear Armageddon, and the civil rights movement in
American society certainly made extremist acts more likely. Months before Kennedy’s
assassination, an extremist assassinated Medgar Evers, and others blew up a church in
Birmingham, Alabama, killing four young girls. These murders were part of the
domestic environment and in the most extreme and literal sense, Kennedy’s murder
prevented him from carrying out his policies. That presidential assassinations are nothing
new makes them a very real aspect of this facet of GPACED.
The most significant foreign policy-related occurrences of the Kennedy
administration reveal the influences of GPACED.

FIGURE 4. Visualization of the impact of GPACED on the Kennedy administration.
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Although the geopolitical situation appears most often as a cause for preventing or
driving foreign policies, the prior administration's impact on Kennedy’s presidency was
dominant. Those policies set in motion during the Eisenhower administration resulted in
the most significant challenges. Compelled, delayed, or prevented from accomplishing
his own objectives almost twice as often as he accomplished them, Kennedy passed those
foreign policy failures and successes on to the Johnson administration.
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CHAPTER V

JOHNSON
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency began shortly after 12:30 PM, Central Standard
Time, on November 22, 1963. His was one of the few administrations to start
unexpectedly, and he had no specific foreign policy goals -- goals that most presidents
form and express during election campaigns. Instead of articulating policies, LBJ
concentrated on uniting the country in the wake of Kennedy’s murder. America’s faith in
politics without violence was shaken and even though a pervasive mood of doom and
gloom gripped the nation, LBJ succeeded in winning the trust of the public. America’s
political system, he insisted, would survive this crisis.153
Johnson had been a politician most of his adult life. His New Deal platform had
gotten him elected to Congress in 1937, if only by a slim margin. After a failed bid for a
Senate seat, he joined the naval reserves for a brief tour as a lieutenant commander in
World War Two. A competent naval officer and advocate of shipbuilding during his time
with the Navy, Johnson remained a politician at heart -- the combat award he "earned"
while a passenger on a bomber in the Pacific indicates that his tour of duty was little
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more than a political stunt. He returned to the House of Representatives and in 1948 won
a Senate seat. By 1955, he had become the youngest senate majority leader in history,
and one of the country’s most formidable political figures. His reputations for crudeness
and cloak room arm twisting were much deserved.154
The politically ambitious Johnson had competed unsuccessfully against Kennedy
in 1960 for the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate nomination, and when he
assumed his duties as vice president, JFK denied him an office in the White House.
Filling a general supervisory role at NASA and several other agencies, Johnson chaired
National Security Council meetings even though McGeorge Bundy, who did have an
office in the White House, managed most of the foreign policy. Johnson thus became the
nation’s ambassador of goodwill, traveling to thirty-three countries on “show the flag”
missions and, when at home, drew assignments like entertaining the West German
Chancellor during the Bay of Pigs crisis. Despite this deliberate sidelining, Johnson
gained relevant foreign policy experience during an assessment tour of Southeast Asia, its
most crucial stop being in the Republic of Vietnam.155 Nevertheless, his forte was
domestic politics and unlike Kennedy, who was a strong leader, Johnson preferred to
make decisions by building consensus. These consensus decisions often led to belated
courses of action involving a great deal of compromise and incremental decision making,
the results of which often fell short of stated goals.
Johnson began his presidency with Kennedy’s foreign policy team and maintained
the in-house National Security Council structure installed by McGeorge Bundy, who
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continued to control information flow into and out of the White House. Much like
Kennedy, LBJ relied on a small core group of advisors, in this case the "Awesome
Foursome" that included Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. He held weekly working lunches
to discuss policy with his team, and these lunches developed into the administration’s
chief foreign policy planning sessions. Unlike Kennedy, he relied heavily on Secretary
of State Rusk for guidance, a relationship that eventually pushed Bundy out of the group.
Bundy knew what was at stake and complained in a memo to Johnson that Rusk, and not
the president, was is in direct communication with the Soviet government.156 The memo
did not have its desired effect, and Walt Rostow became the president’s National Security
Advisor. Previously head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, Rostow
was experienced in America’s current foreign policy challenges and had often
participated in Kennedy's small group foreign policy planning sessions.157
Johnson's preference for small-group strategy planning sessions perpetuated the
problems of Kennedy’s foreign policy planning apparatus. The compartmented nature of
the meetings made it difficult for accurate information to flow to the agencies that carried
out the policies. The president and his team also micromanaged the military effort in
Vietnam, going so far as to make some tactical level decisions. One 1967 memo from
National Security Advisor Rostow to Johnson even recommended targets for Operation
Rolling Thunder.
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked me to put to you their agreed
recommendations about which targets submitted by the JCS in Rolling Thunder

156
White House, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson: Agenda for Tuesday Lunch, by McGeorge Bundy. (Washington
D.C.: White House, 1965), 1. https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550.
157
George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War, (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1994), 1-12.

88

53 should be accepted at the present time, and which should be deferred until after
Tet and until after we see what, if anything, develops in the various flowered
negotiating tracks.
They would accept nine military support targets (marked in red in the table
attached to the enclosed map: barracks, ammo and supply depots. This table also
indicates with a (d) the JCS targets which they recommend for deferral.158
During the siege of Khe San, LBJ followed the battle's progress on a scale model in his
situation room, at one point telephoning the base commander for an update. Feeling
deeply responsible for the troops in harm’s way and equally responsible for the outcome
of the war in Vietnam, he also sought to prevent the conflict from widening into a fight
with China or the Soviets. But Johnson's interest in strategy and broader military
organizational affairs stopped there; Secretary of Defense McNamara ran the military and
the war effort with the president's blessing. McNamara was a superb manager, but had
no experience in military leadership, and a dysfunctional relationship between the
president's staff and senior military officers soon resulted.159 In one terse telephone
conversation between Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Earle
Gilmore Wheeler, Wheeler even instructed McNamara to let him overrule the service
chiefs’ recommendations for a Vietnam bombing program. Similarly, when McNamara
overrode his generals' decisions about the use of air power, Wheeler demanded
justification.160
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Johnson's efforts to correct obvious communication problems in his
administration resulted in his 1966 National Security Action Memorandum no. 341,
which created the Senior Interdepartmental Group and Interdepartmental Regional
Group. Better coordination between his foreign policy planners and the agencies who
carried out the plans -- chiefly the Departments of Defense, State, and the ClA -- was the
objective.161 Unfortunately, these new groups only duplicated efforts, adding to the
confusion and disunity, while friction between civilians and the military continued to
widen the gap of miscommunication. The tension in Johnson's administration echoed the
prevailing public fear of an out-of-control military bent on starting a nuclear war. The
president believed it was important for the civilian leadership to keep military leaders in
check, but his foreign policy planning apparatus only magnified his own penchants for
micromanagement and indecision.162
Johnson’s foreign policy, like Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s, was a variation of the
containment strategy handed down from Truman. Using Kennedy’s foreign policies as a
starting point, Johnson acknowledged that the United States must remain strong – global
communism was still the main threat – but also called for America to be temperate and
just. Seeking to capitalize on Kennedy’s limited détente, he told a State Department
audience that diplomats needed to show patience and understanding for other systems as
well as our own.163 Also like his predecessor’s foreign policy infrastructure, Johnson’s
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organization consolidated planning and decisions at the executive level while isolating
the primary decision-makers from the resources of the rest of the government. Most of
his key foreign policy team members had provided counsel to Kennedy and, rather than
improving on the process or correcting noted deficiencies, Johnson and his advisors
carried forward the negative aspects of Kennedy’s foreign policy-making apparatus and
made them worse. But while Johnson wished to emphasize the diplomatic element of
national power, America's military involvement in Vietnam consumed his efforts, and
LBJ's ineptitude as a commander in chief only compounded the problem. Historian
George C. Herring's rating of him as the least effective war president in American history
is a fair assessment. However, GPACED exerted a significant impact on LBJ’s
performance as commander-in-chief.
Not that all of Johnson's efforts failed; in 1964, his emphasis on diplomacy
proved a success when Fidel Castro used Guantanamo Naval Base as leverage to protest
the detention of Cuban fishing boats. When Castro shut off the water to the American
installation, Johnson’s administration ordered the Navy create its own water supply so
that a more serious confrontation could be avoided. The idea had originated in a
telephone conversation with Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), when Mansfield suggested
that Guantanamo should establish its own water supply and pull out of the existing water
agreement with Cuba for breach of contract. Not only was this a diplomatically sound
option, but it would save the fourteen-thousand-dollar monthly fee that the U.S. paid to
Castro’s government.164 Later that year, when Panamanians rioted in the U.S.-controlled
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Panama Canal Zone, LBJ took a similarly non-violent route and got a successful
outcome. Dozens of people, including four American soldiers, had died and Panama
suspended diplomatic relations with the United States pending a revision of all treaties
with America. Rather than intervene militarily, Johnson responded by withholding
economic aid and threatening to build a new canal elsewhere. Subsequent talks produced
normalized relations and a draft agreement by 1967, and peace had been preserved. But
even diplomatic solutions came with costs; in order to avoid the use of force, the U.S.
government made concessions that would affect subsequent administrations.
Nor was diplomacy always possible, as a crisis in the Dominican Republic
proved. When the Dominican Republic's president, Donald Reid Cabral, found himself
losing a civil war, the assistance he requested from the United States was military.
Within a week, over twenty-three thousand American troops were in his country
preventing an overthrow by insurgents that Johnson, on the advice of United States
Information Agency Director Carl T. Rowan, characterized as a communist threat.
According to Rowan, it would be “well-nigh impossible” to justify the presence of so
many American troops solely on the grounds that they were protecting Americans and
other foreigners. Once the communist takeover claim had proved just as dubious, Rowan
then provided suggestions to mitigate the anticipated charges of gunboat diplomacy and
consequent demonstrations or attacks against American embassies in Latin America.165
The price of keeping a regime friendly to American business ventures in power was a
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further damaging of U.S.-Latin American relations. What little goodwill gained by the
under-performing Alliance for Peace program fell victim to gunboat diplomacy.166
More carefully considered U.S. military commitments were not always safe,
either. Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treay Organization (NATO) in
1949, France had been a charter member and key part of America’s containment policy.
That came to an end in 1966 when President Charles de Gaulle orchestrated his country's
withdrawal and demanded that NATO remove its troops and headquarters from French
territory. In 1964, the French government had granted diplomatic recognition to the
People's Republic of China -- the same year that China had become a nuclear power -and the departure from NATO was but another indication that de Gaulle intended to steer
an independent course. However, by denying NATO the use of French ports, he was also
making it more difficult for Johnson to maintain American troops in Europe, and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk soon found himself seeking French permission for
American and other NATO militaries to be in France during emergencies.167
France’s withdrawal from NATO also complicated Johnson’s efforts to provide
weaker European countries with military and economic assistance. In a planning memo
on the NATO French withdrawal, Rusk warned LBJ that Congress would not provide
enough resources to maintain an integrated European deterrent if France pursued separate
agreements with the remaining NATO members.168 In 1967, NATO lost more of its
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military strength when Great Britain recalled its forces from the European mainland and
West Germany failed to build up its forces to previously agreed upon strengths. Both of
these developments weakened NATO significantly, and with it, America's containment
policy.169 A flagging European economy and heightened European nationalism led by
France’s abandonment of NATO compounded the problem.
Meanwhile in the Middle East, Egyptian and Israeli attitudes toward one another
had not changed since the Suez Crisis of 1956 and, in June 1967, Johnson's efforts to
solve rising tensions there were frustrated by what became known as the Six Day War.
After a series of Arab-Israeli skirmishes, Egypt’s Nasser closed of the Strait of Tiran,
cutting off the Israeli port of Eilat's Red Sea access. Israel responded by attacking Egypt,
and efforts by LBJ’s administration and the United Nations failed to halt the fighting.
The Israeli victory drew threats of military intervention from the Soviets; threats that
Johnson countered by ordering the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet to the region. The threat of
superpowers entering the conflict brought most of the fighting to a halt, while a United
Nations Security Council Resolution ostensibly settled territorial disputes. In practice,
however, the UN resolution only broadened the claims of the antagonists, further
polarizing the Middle East. All the while, America’s open support of Israel with modern
weapons complicated its self-proclaimed role as an objective peace broker.
A CIA memo on the eve of the Six-Day War summed up the challenges America
was facing in the Middle East; an entire generation of Arabs had been raised to believe
that modern Israel would never have existed without American and British assistance.
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Rising Arab nationalism sought the destruction of Israel, yet the Arabs knew that
America would always come to Israel’s aid. Many Arabs called for boycotts and terror
activities against all Western diplomatic and economic presence in the Middle East. The
Israelis also resented American regional presence because they believed America was
holding them back; that they knew how to defeat the Arabs if only America would step
aside. There were hardened attitudes towards America on both sides of the Middle East
conflict.170 After the Six-Day War, much of that assessment played out. Some countries
turned towards the West while others, like Iraq, sought help from the Soviets. Iran
dangled the possibility of joining the Soviets if America did not increase aid. Israeli
promises not to develop nuclear weapons rang hollow. As America’s standing in the
Middle East suffered, its ability to contain the Soviets suffered as well.171
Elsewhere, the Johnson administration did manage to negotiate two treaties
successfully, both of which dealt with nuclear weapons. In 1967 America joined other
nations, including the Soviet Union, in signing the Outer Space Treaty, a ban of nuclear
weapons in space. The next agreement was the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
in which the nuclear-capable signatories, including the Soviets, agreed not to provide
nuclear weapons technologies to non-nuclear capable nations. Those signatory nations
who did not already possess nuclear weapons agreed not to seek the capability. Not
surprisingly, the countries this treaty targeted (China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and South
Africa) did not sign. Johnson had scheduled a third arms control summit, but the 1968
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Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia derailed it. Meanwhile, North Koreans seized the
American spy ship USS Pueblo, causing a significant distraction.
The president had to personally brief leaders of Congress on numerous occasions
about the circumstances of the ship's capture, its mission, why it was not protected, and
what America was going to do to recover the captured crew members. He consulted
national command authorities from former administrations for advice, including
Eisenhower, who suggested a full range of options including the use of atomic weapons
against bridges spanning the Yalu River so that commerce with China would be cut.172
North Korea kept the ship, its spy gear, and its classified documents -- an intelligence
treasure for communist enemies -- and the crew came home only after nearly a year of
negotiations.173 Johnson's own state department sometimes proved less reliable than the
former Republican president. Early in his presidency, the administration had been
working with a military junta to overthrow Brazil's president, Joao Goulart, whom
Kennedy had viewed as an unreliable leftist. A CIA operation launched during the
Kennedy administration to remove Goulart from power had seriously destabilized the
country, allowing the coup to succeed, and the State Department officially recognized the
military leaders of the coup without the Johnson's consent.174 Although angry that he was
not informed, Johnson did not reverse the State Department’s actions but provided the
Brazilian coup leaders with military assistance and a show of force. On April 1, 1964,
the coup succeeded.
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Having inherited a big military and a weakened diplomatic capability from the
Kennedy administration, Johnson also inherited the previous administration’s secretary of
defense. With little knowledge of military doctrine, Robert McNamara relied instead on
the business management approach that had worked so well for him at Ford. That
approach manifested itself in the adoption of the Planning Programming Budgeting
System, a budget forecasting and control concept started under Kennedy. This was a
system for identifying military requirements and budgeting for what McNamara thought
necessary rather than what the armed services requested. Sometimes this quest for
efficiency worked, even though fights over government waste often played out in the
national press. One Associated Press story accused the Navy of wasting hundreds of
thousands of dollars on uniforms, and William Newman of the General Accounting
Office confirmed that the Navy was spending 2.5 cents per “non-functioning buttonholes
in double-breasted coats.”175
Unfortunately, McNamara’s purportedly efficient budgeting system produced
unintended consequences as well as intended ones. It increased inter-service rivalry and
competition as the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments vied for more tightly
controlled resources. Military leaders openly resented McNamara’s micromanagement,
and McNamara countered by replacing all of the joint chiefs of staff with more
deferential officers, citing a need for civilian supremacy over the military. Having
transformed the U.S. war command system to one of crisis management by yes men,
McNamara now operated with a chain of command that ran from the president through
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himself directly to the commanders in the field, bypassing the uniformed service chiefs,
who should have been advising the president on how best to use his military capabilities.
To maintain at least some influence, the JCS Chairman, General Wheeler, adopted a
“Foot in the door” policy with President Johnson. His tactic was to push for what he
wanted but to accept what he could get.176
Despite his preference for diplomacy, Johnson's chief tool for containing the
communist threat was the large military built by Kennedy; a military whose strategic
command and control system was degraded by McNamara's leadership style. It was this
powerful yet dysfunctional tool that LBJ would use to address another inheritance from
the previous administration and one that would consume his presidency: Vietnam.
Johnson did not want to fight a war there, but Eisenhower's SEATO commitment,
Kennedy’s increase in military advisors, and an underlying belief in containment made
any other course unlikely. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, further
escalation became inevitable, although Johnson cited the Senate’s overwhelming
intention to honor its SEATO obligations as reason enough for America’s involvement.177
But deploying major combat units still bothered him. Campaigning for reelection in
1964, he told prospective voters that he was "not about to send American boys nine or ten
thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for
themselves.”178 This reflected the Kennedy administration's original intent, as outlined in
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National Security Action Memorandum 273, written for Kennedy but authorized by
Johnson in November 1963, shortly after JFK's funeral. It had set defeat of the Viet
Cong as the condition for the withdrawal of all U.S. advisors by 1965, and was optimistic
that victory could be won.179 The problem Johnson faced was that the non-military
solutions he preferred could not happen without security provided by the military. The
threat of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention also weighed heavily on him and, beginning
in March 1965, he committed U.S. ground forces. The commitment was open-ended,
reaching a maximum of 549,500 in 1968, because McNamara never understood what it
would take to win -- the condition for leaving. Meanwhile, his dysfunctional command
structure poured resources into South Vietnam in an uncoordinated and wasteful way.
The U.S. armed services essentially fought individual wars within their respective areas
of responsibility. The Army sought to destroy large enemy formations, concentrating
their efforts on major combat actions. Marine units focused their efforts on
counterinsurgency actions, and the Air Force focused on deep interdiction. Because
McNamara did not know what it would take to win, America's war strategy flowed up
from the tactical unit level in Vietnam rather than down from Washington.
Secretary of State Rusk fought his own separate war, too: a pacification program
aimed at developing governance and infrastructure to support the South Vietnamese
population. His Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, controlled the
program, a hodgepodge of agencies so complicated that the sheer number of programs
exceeded Bunker's capacity for management. Pacification included security; most of
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these programs could not run without military protection against the enemy, but lack of
coordination and inefficient command/control issues made it difficult for Bunker to get
support from American conventional forces. Resorting to ineffective paramilitary units
instead, Rusk also coordinated with other non-military agencies to develop security
programs. 180 One such program, the CIA-run PHOENIX, became infamous for its
counterinsurgency methods; its Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) earned a
reputation as nothing more than assassination teams out to destroy Viet Cong political
infrastructure.181
Because Rusk did not synchronize his diplomatic efforts with McNamara's
military efforts, the resulting compartmentalization and secrecy often brought conflict
between the two. In one instance, bombings near a negotiation site in Hanoi derailed a
diplomatic operation codenamed MARIGOLD, which had been a promising peace
effort.182 Commenting on the dysfunctional nature of the war’s command and control,
Chester Cooper, a senior NSC staffer, stated that the peace effort was “unnecessarily
diffused, duplicative, and less efficient and effective than it should have been.”183
Johnson’s Vietnam ordeal and his presidency ended with the Tet Offensive. He
had tried to contain communism in Vietnam with negotiations, government programs,
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and economic support, yet repeatedly resorted to force. Meanwhile, the seventeen
thousand American advisors in country when he succeeded Kennedy had grown to well
over five hundred thousand combat troops, and twenty-five percent of U.S. foreign aid
was being spent there.184 The realities of GPACED compelled LBJ to fight in Vietnam;
when he took office, U.S. military advisors were already involved in combat, and
abandoning containment was politically unrealistic. However, the inheritance of
unbalanced elements of national power, weakened diplomatic capabilities, and a flawed
foreign policy planning and execution system, is equally obvious. The lack of American
public support and the actions of both the North and South Vietnamese also complicated
American troop when the conditions envisioned in NASN-273 were not established.
Having dictated American involvement in Vietnam, GPACED frustrated LBJ's efforts at
containment once there.
Equally to the point, both happened despite a two-house Democratic majorities.
Eighty-two percent of Congressional votes supported his administration’s actions but the
few exceptions proved significant.185 When France pulled out of NATO, Johnson
struggled to maintain economic assistance to Western Europe and keep American troops
in Europe against the wishes of a vocal Congressional minority. Accommodating the
Israeli lobby before, during and after the Six-Day War was not easy, either.186 Congress
put the most pressure on Johnson towards the end of his administration, when grass roots
opposition to the war in Vietnam was putting pressure on Congress, including fellow
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Democrats. By Johnson's final year in office, congressional support of presidential
policies had dropped from 84% (1964) to 77% (1968) in the House and from 73% (1964)
to 64% (1968) in the Senate.187
Under such conditions, gaining support for administration foreign policy became
a struggle. When Congress cut his administration’s requested budget for the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967 by a third, he expressed his frustration in a signing statement,
warning that “the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 reduces the margin of hope to the
danger point.”188 Weakened support also hampered the approval of LBJ’s 1969 budget
proposal, as his costly foreign policies, especially the war in Vietnam, clashed with
domestic program requirements. Only after withdrawing from the 1968 presidential race
was he able to get the budget through Congress, and only then with a six billion dollar cut
in domestic programs.189
The 1968 presidential election also played into North- and South Vietnamese
government strategizing, both stopped serious negotiations. Johnson warned Senator
Tom McIntyre (D-NH) on December 28, 1967 that “Hanoi will not negotiate until they
see the outcome of the election of November 1968 here.”190 The American election
influenced the Vietnamese in a more direct way as well. The Republican nominee,
former vice president Richard Nixon, had interfered in negotiations with the South
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Vietnamese government while Johnson was trying to broker a peace between North and
South Vietnam. Johnson determined that Nixon's intermediary, the committed anticommunist Anna Chennault, had convinced South Vietnam to withdraw. Shortly before
Nixon took office the national media exposed his meddling when one of Nixon’s
campaign advisors leaked the story. 191 The Nixon camp had received messages from the
South Vietnamese government several days before the election, indicating a possible
delay in participation until after the election.192
No matter who the Democrats nominated in 1968, the Johnson administration
needed a success, or at least palpable progress, in Vietnam. For he needed more money,
and to obtain the money he needed to raise taxes and cut domestic programs; unpopular
actions during an election year. When the 1968 Tet Offensive reduced American public
support for LBJ’s Vietnam policies to ten percent and he withdrew his candidacy, he
nevertheless continued to defend his Vietnam policies as free of election concerns. One
such defense was a discussion with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), who
purportedly accused the president of playing politics with peace negotiations before the
election.193 In fact, Johnson had told his advisors to ignore the political calendar when
negotiating with Hanoi but despite his direction every political decision about Vietnam
was also about the election.194
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The domestic situation towards the end of Johnson’s presidency was especially
challenging. Anti-war sentiment was widespread and very public. Not only was draftdodging common but, in a horrific act of protest to stop the Vietnam War, a young
Quaker burned himself to death outside the Pentagon. The Pentagon was the site of
another anti-war scene when, in October of 1967, fifty thousand protestors marched there
to demand an end to America’s military involvement in Vietnam.195 Civil rights issues
exploded into violence as well, with rioting in cities across America, with the Detroit
riots of 1967 being the country’s worst since the Detroit riots of 1943.196 The civil rights
movement also affected foreign policy, with activists promoting racially motivated
African policies and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy fighting to maintain
control.197 Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were both assassinated in 1968, and
a flagging economy caused Johnson to call for higher taxes. The same sectors of the
American public also saw the Tet Offensive as a U.S. defeat, even though it was a
military victory. Images of the fighting on television contrasted sharply with the progress
reported by the White House. As America’s support for the Vietnam War took a critical
blow, so did LBJ’s efforts to stay the course. His withdrawal from the presidential race
had been the only way out.
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Figure 5. Impact of GPACED on the Johnson administration.

Johnson’s poor foreign planning organization deserves some credit for his
administration’s foreign policy failures but, as discussed above, GPACED dictated much
of its direction, with the prior administration exerting the most influence. His main effort
and the foreign policy actions for which he is most remembered, America’s war in
Vietnam, was a war he did not choose but one that he was compelled to fight.
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CHAPTER VI

NIXON AND FORD

Richard M. Nixon had a brief career in the United States Navy, serving in the
Pacific during World War Two as a transportation officer. In 1946, he employed redbaiting tactics to defeat incumbent Jerry Voorhis in the race for Southern California’s
12th Congressional District and won a Senate seat in 1950 using the same tactics against
Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, who famously referred to him as "Tricky Dick." His
strong political base in California and anti-communist stance got him noticed, and two
years later, at age 39, he became Eisenhower’s vice president. During the next eight
years, Nixon gained foreign policy experience by assuming various presidential duties
whenever Eisenhower was ill. These duties included a July 1959 meeting with Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev, where the two engaged in the “Kitchen Debate.” The previous
spring, Nixon displayed poise and calm during an attack on his motorcade while on a
good will tour in Venezuela. More important was his chairmanship of several National
Security Council meetings while Eisenhower was recovering from illness.198
Gerald Ford's early background is similar in some respects. He served in the
Navy in World War II, seeing action in the Pacific while assigned to the light aircraft
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carrier USS Monterey. After the war, he was elected to the House of Representatives in
1948, becoming House Minority Leader in 1965. In 1973, he came to Nixon's aid,
agreeing to serve as vice president after Spiro T. Agnew’s resignation.199
Both Nixon and Ford were experienced politicians, although Nixon’s foreign
policy duties had given him far more first-hand knowledge and practical experience.
While in Moscow during 1959, he met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to discuss the
ongoing Berlin Crisis and, in addition, outlined the official U.S. position on the status of
Vietnam. Khrushchev used Eisenhower’s policies on Vietnam as an analogy for his own
position on the Berlin Crisis.200 Ford lacked Nixon's foreign policy experience, and was
selected for the vice presidency because of his reputation for cooperation and willingness
to accommodate opposition.
Assisted by few key advisors in the development and execution of his foreign
policy, Nixon relied mainly on one person, Henry Kissinger, who served as his National
Security Advisor. A World War II-era German refugee, Kissinger served in the U.S.
Army during World War II as a military intelligence specialist. After the war, he earned
his Ph.D. in political science at Harvard and remained on faculty there while serving
simultaneously as a consultant to the National Security Council's operations Coordinating
Board and Council on Foreign Relations during Eisenhower's presidency. Working with
Nelson Rockefeller on national security policy, Kissinger later consulted with the
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Kennedy and Johnson administrations on various Cold War foreign policy issues
including nuclear weapons non-proliferation.201
Ford also had few key foreign policy advisors, starting with Nixon’s team but
making changes after his first year in office. He retained Kissinger initially as his
national security advisor and later as secretary of state, appointing Brent Scowcroft to
replace Kissinger as his National Security Advisor. Donald Rumsfeld was named
secretary of defense, and George H.W. Bush, CIA director.202 Retired Lieutenant
General Scowcroft was a career Air Force officer who had gained foreign policy
experience from the military perspective as a senior advisor in the State Department,
Department of Defense, and White House.203 Rumsfeld was a former United States naval
aviator, a four-term Congressman, and a previous member of Nixon’s administration,
where he had directed the Office of Economic Opportunity and served as Nixon’s
ambassador to NATO. Having helped with Ford's transition as White House Chief of
Staff, Rumsfeld succeeded James R. Schlesinger as secretary of defense.204 A former
torpedo bomber pilot, Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the
Texas 7th Congressional district in 1966, and ran unsuccessfully for the Republican
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presidential nomination two years later. After losing a Senate race in 1970, Nixon
appointed him an ambassador, first to the United Nations and later, to China.205
Despite those personnel changes, Ford inherited Nixon's organization, one that
limited foreign policymaking to a very secure inner circle, with Kissinger in charge of all
NSC policy making. In fact, Nixon chose William Rogers to serve as secretary of state
because Rogers had very little experience with diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger often
performed the primary high-level state department functions with secret back-channel
negotiations. For example, the president met with Soviet Ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Dobrynin early on and told him to deal directly with Kissinger on all
matters of consequence.206
Thus isolated from foreign policy planning and decisions, the Departments of
Defense and State took on low priority projects, some of which were never seriously
considered, while Kissinger and Nixon secretly sought détente and an end to the war in
Vietnam on the president’s terms.207 While Kennedy had begun the trend toward an
increasingly smaller foreign policymaking organization, Nixon continued it, making
planning more compartmentalized as well. Ford inherited the secrecy and
compartmentalization but tried to include more of his cabinet in the planning and
decision-making process. A struggle with Kissinger resulted and, not wanting to trust
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both the NSC and State to one person, Ford added Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, and Bush in
what became known as the “Halloween Day Massacre.”208
Nixon publicly announced his foreign policy in the summer of 1969. If it worked,
the Nixon Doctrine would see America extend its political, economic, and diplomatic
support to any country that was threatened by communism while avoiding heavy military
involvement. Threatened nations would be responsible for providing their own defensive
manpower -- America would no longer play world policeman. Nixon preferred
diplomatic engagement with peer powers and emphasized detente with the Soviets and
Chinese, but like the foreign policies of every administration since Truman's, this was a
form of containment. Refining Nixon's emphasis on diplomacy with the communists,
Kissinger insisted on the "linkage" of incentives and disincentives to American foreign
policy goals. Not only might granting or withholding economic aid achieve the same
result but this carrot and stick diplomacy also assumed that each diplomatic action was
linked to all others.209 Meanwhile, Nixon expected supported nations to share the
burdens and responsibilities of local self-defense so that there would be no more
Vietnams.210 Believing as he did in détente, engagement with the Soviets, and improved
relations with the People's Republic of China, Ford shared Nixon's view. He, too, was
committed to providing what support he could to the government of the Republic of
Vietnam.211
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Amidst all of these similarities, Nixon's isolation of the critical planning and
decision making within the White House was the crucial difference, and despite Ford's
efforts to the contrary, after-effects lingered. The danger posed by such a closed system
was not always apparent but, despite Nixon's practical experience in foreign policy, much
of Kissinger's was academic. Because Ford's retreat to a more open process was never
complete, both administrations experienced significant pressures from GPACED.
Nixon’s détente scored a win for his presidency and surprised the world when he
announced an official state visit to the People's Republic of China in 1971. This was not
a total surprise; his earlier easing of restrictions and discontinuation of patrols in the
Taiwan Strait upon taking office hinted at those intentions, as did a May 1969 telegram
from the State Department to the American-UN mission. Early efforts to set the
diplomatic conditions for formal recognition also include Undersecretary of State Elliott
L. Richardson's low-level discussions with other nations about PRC membership in the
UN and Kissinger's secret arrangement of an official state visit during a Chinese tour by
American table tennis players.212 The president had the State Department announce
support for China’s membership in the United Nations, eventually allowing the expulsion
of former U.S. ally Taiwan from the same body. Nixon’s promotion of détente was in
line with his stated foreign policy and Kissinger’s linkage theory. At the expense of
Taiwanese and Japanese relations, better ties with China improved the chances that the
Chinese would lessen their support for North Vietnam, thus making it possible for Nixon
to bring U.S. troops home. The president discussed these reasons for dialog with the
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Chinese during an Oval Office meeting of January 26, 1972, citing the potential for
reducing further confrontation in Vietnam.213 Nixon’s Chinese success was a signature
achievement that would help his reelection campaign.
Meanwhile, mutually assured destruction remained the primary argument against
using nuclear weapons, and an incident involving the construction of a base in Cuba that
could house nuclear-armed Soviet subs reminded Nixon that a nuclear war could erupt
easily. Once in office, he sought to reduce the competition over strategic nuclear
capability, and Kissinger began negotiations with the Soviets for a nuclear arms reduction
treaty. Unfortunately, his backchannel diplomacy and the president’s chief arms control
negotiators often worked at cross purposes, a problem highlighted in a July 20, 1970
White House conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger about
arms control. Kissinger told Dobrynin that lead American arms control negotiator Gerald
Smith was not authorized to discuss certain technical aspects of arms control that would
be included in the treaty, thus disrupting an important effort at disarmament.214 Despite
the confusion caused by Nixon’s compartmentalized foreign policy team, his
administration successfully negotiated agreements to limit the production of anti-ballistic
missile systems and offensive nuclear weapons. These Strategic Arms Limitations Talks,
(SALT I) were another success for Nixon’s foreign policy. And Nixon’s Moscow
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Summit was the first time a sitting American president had visited Moscow since the
Russians formed the Soviet Union.215
Except for Cuba, Nixon and Kissinger preferred to expend little effort on the
Western Hemisphere, the latter once acknowledging to a Chilean diplomat that he knew
nothing about Latin America and did not care. But this did not prevent the U.S. backing
of a coup against Chile’s Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist and lawfully elected
president of Chile. A 1970 National Security Council memo to Kissinger recommended
subsidizing election campaigns of anti-Allende politicians and supporting any
incumbents who also opposed him even before the CIA had commenced covert
operations.216 The brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet followed, bringing unintended
consequences for the CIA in its wake, including congressional restraints on its overseas
operations.217
Later in 1973, at the height of the Watergate crisis, the Yom Kippur War broke
out. The Arabs nearly succeeded in defeating Israel with a well-coordinated effort that
included both military and regional economic cooperation. While the Israelis struggled
to resupply weapons and equipment depleted in the early stages of the fighting, the
Egyptians hoped that a Saudi oil embargo would prevent the Americans from resupplying
Israel while the Soviets replenished the Arab forces. This embargo threat caused such
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great apprehension among the major oil corporations that their leadership wrote President
Nixon of their concerns:
The terms demanded by OPEC at Vienna are of such a magnitude that their
impact could produce a serious disruption in the balance of payments position of
the Western world.
We are convinced of the seriousness of the intentions of the Saudis and Kuwaitis
and that any actions of the U.S. Government at this time in terms of increased
military aid to Israel will have a critical and adverse effect on our relations with
the moderate Arab producing countries.
Much more than our commercial interests in the area is now at hazard. The whole
position of the United States in the Middle East is on the way to being seriously
impaired, with Japanese, European, and perhaps Russian interests largely
supplanting United States presence in the area, to the detriment of both our
economy and our security.218
With Nixon sidelined by the scandal, Kissinger took over foreign policy and managed the
crisis for America. Defying the oil embargo and resupplying the Israelis, he allowed
them to gain the initiative and go on the offensive. Kissinger was also instrumental in
establishing an international observer group to monitor the warring parties and negotiate
a ceasefire once the Israelis had won. He succeeded in preserving Israel but raised the
stakes considerably by bringing all American forces to high alert when the Soviets
threatened to intervene, yielding long-range negative consequences: First, the Israelis
developed a distrust of the United States when it prevented them from completing the
destruction of Arab forces. Second, although the United States had prevented the Israelis
from following through, the American public came to fear weaponized Arab oil policies.
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Third, and a rift developed between the United States and its NATO allies because the
United States did not consult them about its heightened military force readiness.219
Ford began his presidency with one of the same challenges Johnson had faced:
reassuring the country that America’s system of governance would survive a current
presidential crisis. The president and Kissinger also wanted to maintain the positive
gains from Nixon’s détente with the Soviets and improve on SALT I, and Ford’s meeting
with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev soon resulted in a SALT II draft agreement that
placed limits on the numbers of nuclear arms for the next ten years. These new arms
discussions were a limited success, as each side agreed to the framework of the treaty
without ratifying it. 220 During the rest of Ford’s presidency, arguments against the draft
framework of SALT II from both sides of the aisle became political tools to be used
against him in the 1974 mid-term election. In an October 7, 1974, National Security
Council meeting, Ford chastised the State and Defense Departments for allowing leaks of
SALT II negotiations to the press. Not only did media publication of this information
damage the administration, but it was harming the talks as well. President Ford gave his
staff forty-eight hours to stop the leaks.221
Ford continued his détente with Brezhnev during the Helsinki Conference of July
and August 1975, where thirty-five nations met to promote stability and international
cooperation. At stake was the ratification of several agreements, and Ford’s closing

219

William A. Bundy, Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency,
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 430-444.
220
Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 204-205.
221
Minutes: National Security Council Meeting, October 7, 1974, folder: NSC Meeting October 7,
1974, box 1, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974-77, Gerald R. Ford Library.
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/document/0312/1552376.pdf.

115

speech noted that the United States hoped to advance human rights and the free flow of
ideas, information, and people.222 The Soviets, on the other hand, hoped to solidify their
position in Eastern Europe and, although both superpowers signed the agreements, Ford's
Soviet diplomacy did not achieve any advancements. The rapport he gained from earlier
meetings was lost, as his personal exchanges with Brezhnev were antagonistic.
America’s participation in the agreements was viewed, both at home and abroad, as
abandoning Eastern Europe by recognizing the Soviet conquests of World War II as
within their legal boundaries. Ford’s hopes to advance SALT negotiations did not pan
out either. The Helsinki Conference was a setback for détente.223
Johnson left Nixon with what Kennedy had left him. Nixon spent a great deal of
time during his administration working to achieve his goals in Vietnam. He directed
studies on Vietnam soon after entering office and pursued a policy of Vietnamization
based on these studies. Vietnamization, as expressed by Kissinger’s National Security
Study Memorandum of April 1969 required that the Republic of Vietnam be made to
shoulder the load of combat and that American forces conduct a phased withdrawal.224
For the next several years, Nixon and Kissinger embarked on a series of negotiations with
the governments of North and South Vietnam to implement Vietnamization. While
steadily withdrawing American forces, Nixon pressured the North with intensified
American firepower, mainly from the air. He also extended significant American
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military operations to the border countries of Laos and Cambodia, countries that the
North had previously used as staging areas and supply routes without fear of U.S.
interdiction. While American forces fought the North, Nixon pressured the South
Vietnamese leadership to agree to peace terms. His conditions were that any South
Vietnamese government left in place must be able to stand on its own for at least five
years.225
Nixon and Kissinger both believed that all communist movements shared a
common goal and centralized direction. With this belief, the president’s Chinese and
Soviet diplomacy encouraged both to leverage the North Vietnamese leadership into
agreeing to Nixon’s terms, but reaching American goals in Vietnam via Kissinger’s
linkage proved costly. Amid negations, the North frequently attempted to gain ground on
the South with increased military operations, and each time the North attacked, Nixon
responded with force. Nixon’s détente with China and the Soviets gave him some
freedom of action to authorize a massive bombing operation against the North during the
1972 Easter Offensive. By January 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had gotten both sides to
sign the Paris Peace Agreement, the massive bombing of North Vietnam being a key
factor. Unfortunately, adherence to the treaty was unverifiable and unenforceable, and
peace, temporary. Both the North and the South assumed the war would continue
anyway, and actively prepared for the resumption of the fight.226
Nixon achieved his short-term goals in Vietnam, but only delayed the communist
takeover and therefore failed to contain the spread of communism. Compelled to deal
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with Vietnam on account of the previous administration’s policies, he effected more of a
compromise than a success. Significant pressures from GPACED, as noted in the next
section, limited Nixon’s choices in Vietnam.
Ford dealt with the aftermath of America’s failed containment strategy in
Southeast Asia when North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam in 1975. Soon after the
hectic evacuation of Saigon, the president acted against the Cambodians who seized an
American merchant ship, the S.S. Mayaguez. He ordered bombing attacks against
mainland Cambodia and assaulted a Cambodian island, believing the ship’s crew was
being held there. These unplanned frantic responses caused President Ford much
consternation. Angrily chastising his staff, he repeatedly demanded to know why his
orders to prevent boats from leaving the Cambodian island had not been carried out.227 In
fact, poor intelligence and the hurried nature of the operation was the cause of the island
raid’s dozens of pointless casualties. The Cambodians were releasing the merchantmen
around the time that U.S. Marines were attacking the island. Although flawed, Ford’s
decisive response did win him short-lived, but fleeting public approval.228
Meanwhile, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during Nixon’s
entire presidency. His record of sixty-seven percent in presidential victories for
Congressional votes on measures supported by his administration reflects the majority
opposition.229 Much of the pressure Nixon faced from Congress was over Vietnam
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policies. Not only was the War Powers Resolution of 1973 a blow to his freedom of
action, but Watergate had already crippled his presidency when that act went into effect.
Prior to the War Powers Act, Congress had moved to restrict Nixon’s military activities
in Southeast Asia multiple times. From 1970 to 1973, Congress proposed or enacted
twenty-four measures specifically aimed at restricting Nixon’s actions in Vietnam. Nine
of those measures placed significant restraints on the president’s policies in Vietnam,
prohibiting him from conducting operations in some countries while placing limitations
on his force strength in others. The Cooper-Church Amendment of 1970 barred U.S.
forces from Cambodia and the Mansfield Amendment of 1971 went so far as to mandate
the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.230 Nixon’s response to the
latter was especially pointed, emphasizing that "section 601 of this act--the so-called
Mansfield Amendment-does not represent the policies of this Administration. It is
because section 601 of this bill will not in fact alter this policy that I have signed it into
law. I would add, regretfully, that legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist
in the search for a negotiated settlement.”231 These restrictions had a direct impact on the
effectiveness of Nixon’s exit strategy from Vietnam. The Defense Appropriations Act of
1974 -- the final one of Nixon’s presidency -- barred any U.S. combat activities in
Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia by restricting the amount of military aid to South Vietnam.
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Ford’s ability to provide support to South Vietnam, as promised under the Pairs Peace
Agreement, fell short because of this budget.
Ford struggled against a Democratic-controlled Congress throughout his
administration. The Democrats maintained control of Congress during his presidency,
winning only fifty seven percent of the votes he supported.232 Not only had Nixon done
better, but Ford's lack of recourse resulted in fifty-six vetoes. Congressional opposition
was constant; the first significant clash came when a congress pressured by the Greek
lobby seeking assistance in Cyprus terminated military aid to Turkey. Ford managed to
delay the military aid embargo for a year, but eventual capitulation was inevitable. When
the end came, he warned Congress that national security would suffer as a result of its
interference:
The restrictions imposed in this bill on our military assistance to Turkey create
serious problems. Without substantial benefit to any other country, these
restrictions threaten our relations with a country which is a close ally, which is the
eastern anchor of an alliance vital to the security of the United States, and which
plays a fundamental role in the strategic interests of the United States in the
Eastern Mediterranean area. It is for these reasons--the national security interests
of the United States--that we have been providing military assistance to Turkey.
…Congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure.233
Congress proceeded with the embargo, and when the sanctions went into effect, NATO
ally Turkey shut down nearly every American military and intelligence collection base on
its soil. This dealt another blow to containment as Ford lost valuable pieces of America's
defense against the Soviet Union. Congress also cut funding for South Vietnam and
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Cambodia in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, prompting a rebuke from Ford that
equated inadequate funding with likely mission failure and objectives left unachieved.234
As the Republic of Vietnam’s economy collapsed and American support dwindled, the
North Vietnamese sensed an opportunity and quickly overran South Vietnam. The only
request Congress granted for South Vietnam was to support Ford’s evacuation of the
country.235
In 1974, Congress also sank a trade initiative sought by Ford and Kissinger. After
agreeing to a draft treaty, the Soviets were angered when Congress stipulated that they
must recognize human rights before they would allow Ford to join in the commercial
trade treaty. Ford signed the law with Congress’ stipulations but noted that the
complexity of its wording would make it difficult to implement and objectionable to
other countries.236 As Ford had feared, Congress’ efforts to pressure the Soviets
backfired; not only did they reject the treaty but increased their restrictions on Jewish
emigration as well – the very human rights abuses that Congress had hoped to prevent.237
Congress also prohibited Ford from continuing the policy of containment in
Africa, where he had been providing military assistance to the newly independent
Angolan government in its fight against Soviet-backed Leftists. Supported by thousands
of Cuban troops, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was
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gaining ground on Angolan government forces, when Congress cut off funding for
military assistance. “It is time these people put up or shut up,” retorted Ford. “Congress
has lost its guts -- they have cut and run, and we need them on the record. No one who
voted no can tell me to get tough with the Soviet Union. There is a lot of talk but no
guts.”238 Ford was unsuccessful in gaining the funds to support Angola, and without
support, the country quickly fell to MPLA forces. Angola joined the Soviet’s sphere of
influence shortly afterward.239
Desire for a second term in office motivated Nixon’s efforts towards détente, and
his early achievements with China and the Soviets contributed much to his successful
reelection run. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was certain that North Vietnamese foreign
policy actions towards America had hinged on the Nixon campaign, and that the North
Vietnamese expected Nixon to woo voters with a softer Vietnam policy.240 Indeed,
Vietnam was a significant issue in Nixon’s reelection campaign. In October 1972, he
emphasized to Kissinger that he did not want to withdraw from South Vietnam if its
government were to collapse before the American presidential election.241 Domestic
measures, including the Selective Service Reform Bill, which calmed conscription
anxieties, also helped secure his reelection, but in the end, Nixon’s cutthroat political
methods damaged his foreign policy most of all.
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The Watergate scandal was ultimately the biggest obstacle in preventing Nixon
from achieving his foreign policy goals. A scandal of his own making driven in part by
motivations to succeed in the upcoming reelection, it frustrated the president’s attempts at
control. Nixon not only resigned but handed his successor a crippled administration and
Ford -- essentially a lame duck for his entire term -- was unable to achieve any significant
foreign policy goals.
Nixon’s South East Asia foreign policy generated widespread anger among the
public when he informed America about his 1970 Cambodian operations. The
president’s announcement caused hundreds of mass protests at universities nationwide,
including the May 4, 1970 incident at Kent State University that had left four students
dead and another nine wounded. When over 100,000 demonstrators converged on the
White House five days later, Nixon attempted to appease the public by limiting the scope
of the Cambodian operations. He promised that American troops would move no further
than twenty miles into Cambodian territory and leave the country by June 30th.242
Responding to the unrest, Congress formed an ad hoc committee to hear student
views of America’s policy towards South East Asia and sixty-three university students
from dozens of colleges testified in Congress over a two-day period. The initial student
testimonies captured the divisive nature of the Vietnam war’s impact on American
society. Greg Rambo of Kent State voiced support for Nixon’s policies including combat
operations in Cambodia, adding that Senate actions to limit funding of the Cambodian
operations were an insult to the integrity of the president of the United States. The
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second witness was Steve Kramer, a student at Whittier College, California -- Nixon's
alma mater. Kramer described the shocked reactions of students when they learned about
Nixon’s secret invasion of Cambodia and decried the military-industrial complex that had
taken over America. The only way to avoid a civil war in America, he said, was to
remove the power from the corporate-military elite and give it to the people. The
Whittier College student went on to extol the virtues of communism and criticize
American international aggression.243 Not all of the student views were as extreme, but
the ad hoc committee hearings increased the public pressure on Nixon’s Vietnam policies
and brought about additional Congressional scrutiny on the president’s war efforts.
The domestic situation in 1972 factored into strategic decision making. National
Security Council Staffer Winston Lord stated that the U.S. domestic scene was an
argument against a resumption of bombing. Although it would bring temporary support
from conservatives, the left would be critical, and American opinion against the president
would intensify if the aerial attacks did not result in timely war gains on the ground or in
diplomatic breakthroughs.244 Domestic reactions to events elsewhere also mattered.
When the president sent a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan
during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, his lack of neutrality and Kissinger’s backchannel
negotiations with the Chinese resulted in a near confrontation with the Soviets, whose
navy was already supporting India. The New York Times also published secret internal
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documentation of the decisions to support Pakistan; documentation laced with some of
Nixon’s mean-spirited personal attacks on Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi. With the
leak of these “Pentagon Papers,” the White House became increasingly fearful of further
disclosures even though the leaked classified reports also reflected poorly on Kennedy
and Johnson as well as Nixon. Columnist Gary Wills of The Record typified media
criticism of the president when he accused Nixon of using the American public as a tool
for pressuring his enemies.245 Within a week of the release of the Pentagon Papers, the
president’s staff created a special unit nicknamed the “Plumbers” to stop the leaks.
Nixon’s attempts to identify and stop the disclosure of these damning reports drew him
closer to the scandal that allowed the GPACED system to remove him from office.246
The Watergate scandal killed Nixon's foreign policy, and amid the growing
domestic and international perception of the president's abuse of power, his efforts for
détente became ineffective. Kissinger carried the load and tried to maintain détente while
Nixon retreated from the public, but when Nixon stepped down and Ford took over, the
new administration was unable to revive détente effectively. Not only did the office of
the president lose credibility because of Watergate but Ford's pardon of Nixon cost it
even more.247
Nixon was initially effective in attaining the foreign policy goals the system
compelled him to undertake, but his actions also resulted in Watergate and GPACED
punished his administration accordingly. The system prevented both he and Ford from
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achieving their goals at a higher rate than the previous administrations.

Figure 6. Impact of GPACED on the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Congress exerted the most influence. The system of GPACED dominated foreign policy
for the duration of Ford’s presidency and did not release its grip until the next
administration took power.
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CHAPTER VII

CARTER

Jimmy Carter graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and
became a nuclear submarine engineer officer, but resigned his commission after his
father’s death to run the family business. As Carter’s business flourished, he became
active in local politics and in 1962 won a seat as a Georgia state senator. He became
Governor of Georgia on his second attempt, and from there secured the Democratic Party
nomination, winning a narrow victory in the 1976 election. As president, Carter was a
religious man with strong convictions who genuinely cared for people and wanted a
government that would work for the public good. Acting on this central leadership
theme, he tried to represent the public interest by choosing morally correct goals rather
than politically expedient ones. He also believed that he was serving the global
community as well as America, and that an inherently "stupid and venal" government
could not succeed. Only intelligence and honesty would solve problems. Unfortunately,
his sense of political timing for major initiatives was flawed.248
Domestic issues accounted for the bulk of President Carter’s experience; he came
to the presidency with no practical knowledge in foreign policy. What he brought to the
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office was a strong work ethic and executive experience gained as Georgia’s governor.
He also brought a keen, detail-oriented mind and a tendency to work out problems by
himself; a habit he had developed in previous offices. Working with this hands-on
mindset, President Carter tried to learn everything about an issue so that he could fix it
from a position of knowledge. He spent thirty hours a week reading background
information on matters brought to him for consideration, which often made him more
knowledgeable about proposed legislation than congressional committee leaders. But if
Congressmen did not have the slightest idea what was in their bills, Carter’s own
expertise stemmed from a work ethic that ultimately overtaxed him.249 This penchant for
doing too many things at once with little prioritization prevented him from seeing
individual problems in a broader geopolitical context.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski were Carter’s principal foreign policy team members. Experience as the
deputy secretary of defense under President Johnson and participation in the Paris Peace
Talks in 1968 and 1969 had convinced Vance that America was unable to solve every
problem. Instead of military intervention, he believed in peace through negotiations and
economic ties. Brzezinski, on the other hand, distrusted the Soviets and had no faith in
détente – attitudes one might expect of a Polish immigrant with practical experience as a
foreign policy advisor under Kennedy and Johnson.250
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Reacting against Nixon’s centralized foreign policy apparatus, Carter established
a decentralized one in which cabinet members took his direction and then implemented
policy at the department level. He also expected cabinet members to be friends and
equals rather than competitors in argument mode during coordination meetings. A more
open administration whose policymaking included the entire cabinet, he reasoned, would
avoid the sort of duplicity that had plagued previous administrations. Accordingly,
Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-2 reorganized his administration’s National
Security Council structure by consolidating a few subgroups that existed under Nixon’s
NSC and placing them in a Policy Review Committee. Notably, Carter also took the
chairmanship of this consolidated group from Brzezinski and gave Vance more control
over national security council sessions.251
Ironically, Carter’s inclusiveness revived a process that he had hoped to discard.
Like Johnson, Carter held weekly breakfast meetings; only the key players --Vance,
Brzezinski, Vice President Mondale, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- had
changed. Carter led the discussions, and foreign policy decisions were made at these
working breakfasts.252 The decisions required staffing for effective implementation, but
Carter’s hands-on, central coordinator method of leadership left room for
miscommunication and omissions.
Carter began his administration without a chief of staff. He attempted to handle
all communication himself but eventually realized he needed assistance to manage the
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volume of work passing through his office. Hamilton Jordan was the solution. As chief
of staff, he conducted a study of staff functions and noted that it was difficult to track, let
alone control the information flow of foreign policy actions coming to the president’s
office. Jordan also noted that Brzezinski and a few others were bypassing the staff and
bringing foreign policy memos directly to Carter.253 While Jordan brought some
organizational control to the White House, the president’s deep simultaneous
involvement in many issues at once created problems for his foreign policy
implementation.
President Carter wanted to correct the wrongs of the Johnson and Nixon
administrations, and bring back honest government that met the needs of the common
public. Fittingly, he had campaigned for president using a fair, open, decent, and
competent government platform, all themes countering the Vietnam and Watergate eras.
The president and his secretary of state held Wilsonian views -- they sought to cooperate
in the spirit of peace with America’s competitors while pushing for human rights causes,
and helping developing nations.254 Carter presenting his purportedly more democratic
and humane foreign policy at the University of Notre Dame's Spring 1977
commencement, reaffirming America’s commitment to human rights and vowing to
reinforce America's bonds with other democracies. President Carter also called for
engagement with the Soviets to halt nuclear and conventional arms proliferation and
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bring about peace in the Middle East.255 Presidential Directive /NSC-18, US National
Strategy, emphasized the non-military elements of power, especially diplomacy and
economics. The spirit of NSC-18 shifted competition with the Soviets to political
engagement, with diplomacy being the main effort.256
Secretary of State Vance worked early to set the conditions for Carter’s Middle
East Peace initiatives and, although the president’s immediate goal of reviving the
Geneva Conference was not attainable, he did convince the leaders of Israel and Egypt to
meet at Camp David. The meetings between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s
Menachim Begin produced no agreement, but Carter’s follow-up diplomacy produced an
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty several months later. While the agreement fell short of
Carter’s goals, it did produce calmer relations between Egypt and Israel.257
Diplomacy with China early in his administration also brought limited success.
At the expense of Taiwan’s peace of mind – China agreed not to seek unification by force
– America normalized diplomatic relations with Communist China. When the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan in April 1979, Carter responded by authorizing the sale of
equipment and sharing of intelligence with the Chinese, but pressuring the Kremlin in
this way meant that Carter had to backtrack on his human rights principles. Congress
resisted, and passed a Taiwan Relations Act containing provisions for American arms
sales to Taiwan should the People's Republic of China attack. The act specified that
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“…the United States shall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capacity."258 These defense provisions caused strained relations with the
newly recognized Communist Chinese.
Another initial success for the Carter Administration was the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) with the Soviet Union, but it also encountered a human
rights stumbling block. Repeated American attempts to link human rights to the treaty
complicated the negotiations, but the Soviets eventually relented. An extension of
Mutually Assured Destruction, SALT II aimed at maintaining strategic nuclear weapons
parity between the two superpowers. Once Carter and Brezhnev had signed the
agreement in Vienna, it encountered strong opposition led by Senate Armed Services
Committee member Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona). He would vote against ratification, he
told Carter, because verification of Soviet compliance would be impossible.259
Congressional resistance and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented SALT II’s
ratification.
The SALT II agreement was but one of several major foreign policy initiatives
during 1977-1979, when efforts to secure a Middle East peace agreement and ratification
of the Panama Canal Treaty were also in progress. Such ambitious foreign policy goals
compounded the effects of changes in the geopolitical environment. Carter’s personal
overextension did not go unnoticed either, with White House Chief of Staff Jordan
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critiquing his multitasking, arbitrary deadlines, and out-of-context decision making.
Carter acknowledged his problem in a hand-written reply and characterized his situation
as frantic.260 This frantic situation caused him to overlook a developing problem in Iran.
The problem was Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s increasingly despotic rule and
the disagreement among key foreign policy advisors over how to deal with it. This
division and Carter’s inattention contributed to the loss of American influence in the
region. The April 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compounded the problem,
making Carter’s goals of engagement and reduction of military competition with the
Soviets unattainable. Once again, the Cold War heated up, this time with anti-Soviet
embargoes and a notoriously unpopular U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics. This debut
of the Carter Doctrine, a declaration that threats in the Persian Gulf constituted an assault
on U.S. vital interests, in turn caused Carter to stop Congress’s military budget slashing
and develop Enhanced Radiation Weapons.261 In his 1980 Presidential Directive 59,
“Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy” (PD-59), Carter announced to the Soviets that
any nuclear attack on America would be met with enough force to render any gains
meaningless. Not only did PD-59 explicitly extend American nuclear targeting to Soviet
industrial, political, and urban centers, but civilian population centers as well; a strategy
nearly identical to that ordered by Eisenhower in 1958.262 Like Carter, he had concluded
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that only a retaliatory strike against both military and urban-industrial targets would
destroy Soviet nuclear offensive capability.263 As with previous administrations, the
geopolitical situation forced Carter to engage the Soviets in Cold War rhetoric and
emphasize military power over diplomacy.
World events also led to a reversal of human rights policy in Central America.
National Security Advisor Brzezinski’s January 1979 memo to Carter expressed the
administration’s stance on Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, whose widely reported
human rights violations had caused the withdrawal of American support. The
Nicaraguan leader did not align with communist ideologies, which was important for
America interests in the Western Hemisphere, but his harsh methods violated American
desires to support international human rights. Carter’s intentions to remove military and
economic aid from Somoza’s regime are clear in a memo prepared for him by
Brzezinski.264
Without American support, Somoza fell, but Cuban-backed Sandinistas soon
gained control of Nicaragua, frustrating American plans. In a reversal of his Somoza
policy, Carter offered the Sandinistas aid incentives even though the Sandinistas had
committed human rights violations of their own. Reports of summary executions made
the newspapers; one report claiming that thousands of members of the Somoza regime
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and their families had been shot.265 In a Congressional working breakfast session, Carter
urged support for a huge supplemental aid package to Nicaragua, laying out several
incentives for the Sandinistas and stressing the prevention of a Nicaragua-Soviet-Cuba
alliance.266
The geopolitical situations in the Middle East and Central America forced Carter
to amend his foreign policies, as did the threat of Soviet involvement in those areas.
Challenges from Congress only compounded these problems, as Jimmy Carter did not
have a harmonious relationship with Capitol Hill. Through the course of his
administration, he had lost in four Congressional votes -- a poorer record than either
Kennedy or Johnson, and only slightly better than Nixon -- despite Democratic control of
the House for his entire presidency and control of the Senate except for his last year in
office.267 Early in his term, those poor relations with Congress became apparent when
loss of a vote on a domestic issue caused heated debate and criticism from Congress. The
president's staff responded to several specific criticisms by claiming that the current poor
executive-congressional relations were an ongoing problem that had begun in the prior to
his administration and had only grown worse since Carter took office.268
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Senator James B. Allen (D-Alabama) typified the congressional resistance.
Opposing Jimmy Carter’s Panama Canal policy, Allen noted that Carter had reneged on a
campaign promise when he signed the Panama Canal Treaty, for in a 1976 debate with
Gerald Ford, he had taken a hardline stance towards maintaining American control of the
canal.269 The president’s move to push forward a treaty early in his term, although
unexpected by some and contested by many, did nest well with his national security
strategy. However, congressional efforts to alter the spirit of the agreement dogged
Carter’s team, with Senator Allen urging an indefinite presence of American military to
defend and maintain neutrality of the canal.270 The president’s administration spent a
great deal of energy battling Allen and others, finally securing ratification by a slim
margin.
Congress and Carter were often at odds over the budget, too. Although the
president was able to achieve an initial cut in the defense budget that halted the B-1
Bomber, National Security Advisor Brzezinski was concerned about his long-range
budget planning. In a March 1978 memo to the president, Brzezinski pointedly noted the
budget's foreign policy implications and that economics alone should not guide it.
America’s friends and enemies, he argued, took cues from the Department of Defense
funding and arms control efforts.271 Brzezinski’s warning soon became a reality when
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the Soviets interpreted Carter’s budget actions as an American retreat and stepped up
their military activities.
The near-constant resistance from Congress played a significant role in Jimmy
Carter’s dim prospects for reelection. As America’s national politics played out in the
international media, other governments noted his weakened congressional and public
support. This magnified the 1980 election's effect on Carter’s foreign policy, his “lame
duck” status being a relevant factor in the Iranian Hostage crisis. One memo from CIA
Director Stansfield Turner warned that the time for accomplishing any agreement with
the Iranians before Ronald Reagan’s inauguration was running out and that the Iranians
had to believe that they would get a better deal from Carter for that agreement to
happen.272 Despite Turner’s efforts, Iran rebuffed Carter, and hostage recovery efforts hit
a dead end until the new administration came to power.
Carter also spent money on foreign humanitarian assistance for the first three
years of his presidency despite the voting public's disapproval. Only when his bid for
reelection neared did he begin to regard domestic political consequences seriously,
proposing a significant reduction in foreign humanitarian aid. But that change, of course,
did not help America’s best interests abroad, and it came too late to satisfy a political
base more interested in domestic programs.273
Hamilton Jordan's White House staff study, conducted late in Carter’s first year in
office, shows the effect of those domestic concerns on the president’s foreign policies. In
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his findings and recommendations, Jordan urged Carter to change the way his
administration developed and implemented foreign policy. Especially concerned that
newspapers and political opponents were capitalizing on leaked national security policy
plans, he favored active preemption of leaks rather than reacting to them after the fact.274
Throughout his administration, Carter struggled to keep his foreign policy formulation
free of domestic politics, yet his efforts to make them more transparent made that
struggle more difficult. While the president’s public image affected U.S. foreign
relations, so did domestic energy programs.
President Carter’s national address on the energy crisis backfired on him. His
perceptions of a declining national mood and consequent call for civil cooperation in
making America better became famously known as the “Malaise Speech.” American
lack of respect and confidence in its institutions had, in his estimation, caused a gap
between society and government. While his conclusions were debatable, that plea for
Americans to have faith in each other and the administration clearly overshadowed his
efforts to gain support for his energy programs. Public support declined as a result, and
many of Carter's former supporters concluded that he was a weak and ineffective
president. Newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis aptly expressed the national attitude
towards the president by writing that Carter’s character had not translated itself into the
sort of leadership that makes Washington work.275
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Figure 7. Impact of GPACED on Carter administration.

Jimmy Carter’s few foreign policy successes occurred early in his administration,
with GPACED preventing the accomplishment of his favorite goals. Instead, it
compelled him to carry out those foreign policies he had most wanted to avoid. The
previous administration did not affect Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, but the GPACED's
other elements exerted significant pressures, nevertheless. Figure 7 illustrates the Carter
administration’s struggle against the system and eventual reversal of his chosen foreign
policy goals. Although GPACED forced him to pursue those reversed objectives for new
reasons, GPACED was still the deciding factor in dictating the course of his foreign
policy.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Each of the presidents discussed in the preceding chapters came into office with
clear foreign policy goals but, although each administration met some of those goals with
relative ease, unforeseen challenges were the norm. Often compelled to undertake
strategies not of their choosing, and sometimes prevented from accomplishing their
chosen foreign policies altogether, those presidents faced complex patterns of influence
that were impossible to control even when their effects were obvious. That such a murky
process as GPACED produced such clear results might seem counterintuitive were it not
a shared tendency of six consecutive administrations. All of the presidents in this study
tended to achieve crucial foreign policy goals early in their terms, while later efforts in
line with previously stated objectives encountered more resistance.
A second tendency is that GPACED compels administrations to act more often
than it compels them to sit still. All but Nixon and Ford took actions not of their
choosing, but even compromise involves more action than inaction. Those two
exceptions encountered more delays and obstructions than pushes from Congress, a
possible result of Nixon’s impeachable criminal activities and subsequent resignation.
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Figure 8 displays foreign policies forced on administrations along with
accompanying trends. The numbers in each block represent the instances when the
system altered foreign policies, either by compulsion or prevention.

Figure 8. GPACED Visualized: Presidencies Compared.

A third tendency is that some elements of GPACED usually carry more influence
than others. In the preceding historical case studies, the most influential element is the
geopolitical environment, an unpredictable element that causes administrations to react
rather than act. In terms of influence and leverage on presidential administrations,
Congress runs a close second.
Figure 9 illustrates the number of instances that each element of GPACED
exerted a significant influence on foreign policies. In all but one case study, the
geopolitical environment is the most cited element, although Congress affected the Nixon
and Ford administrations as much, Watergate being the likely factor in this increased
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Congressional activity. The most influential element after Congress is the prior
administration, but there is an exception here as well. The Carter Administration did not
encounter significant prior administration influence on foreign policy, probably because
Congress had exerted such an extreme impact on Ford’s presidency, effectively
preventing him from accomplishing anything of significance in the wake of Vietnam and
Watergate.
Examining these historical examples through the lenses of GPACED
demonstrates the effects of the system on presidential freedom of action where foreign
policy development and execution is concerned.

Figure 9. Impact of elements of GPACED on each administration.

More than the president, the GPACED system establishes what can be done, what must
be done, and the direction an administration will go by defining the environment, the
problem set, and choices available. And because the executive selects foreign policy
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actions within the confines of GPACED, he must frequently choose between the lesser of
two evils. Presidents are remembered for these choices, which history often judges to be
poor, yet the systemic constraints that lead to these choices seldom draw as much
attention. An appreciation of GPACED allows us to see these presidential decisions in a
different light. Neither absolving individual presidents nor removing ownership of key
foreign policy actions from them, it nevertheless enables a broader understanding of
presidential foreign policy decision making. In the end, it shows us how often those
decisions were forced by the system rather than chosen by an individual acting solely on
his own volition.

143

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES

Books
Schlesinger, James. America At Century’s End. New York: Columbia University Press,
1989. This book has two central arguments. The author contends that political
divisions are the normal conditions in the environment of national policy
formulation. Schlesinger also contends that the executive branch can only lead
through persuasion. The highest art for American statesmen and politicians is to
have the ability to forge consensus.
Government Sources
Authorization for Use of Military Force. Statutes at Large 115 (2001).
https://www.congress. gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint resolution/23?q=%7B
%22search%22%3A% 222001+Authorization
+for+Use+of+Military+Force%22%7D&s=4&r=18. This law authorizes
presidents to deploy military forces against any entity considered to be associated
with the 11 September 2001 terror attacks against the United States. The law
confers broad powers to the president to conduct operations against terrorists and
associated infrastructure in other sovereign territories and countries. This law
has been challenged by Congress, with attempts to overturn or modify it
numerous times.
Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency: The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis. Washington
D.C.: FRUS, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196468v19/d143. This CIA assessment summarizes the situation in the Middle East
leading up to the 1967 Six-Day War. The memo predicts the Israelis will attack
to open their port up. The memo goes on to describe deteriorating attitudes
towards American interference from both Arabs and Israelis.
------. Intelligence Memorandum: Assessment to Reactions of ROK Participation in the
Indochina War. Allen Dulles. Office of the Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 10, NSC 5416.
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary .gov/sites/default/files/research/onlinedocuments/declassified/fy-2013/undated-uk-indochina.pdf. Information paper
provided an assessment of political viability of ROK forces to help the French
fight the Viet Minh. The world communist powers would accept the deployment
but would increase their own support to the Viet Minh. The world at large would
simply see that the US trained, equipped and supported the ROKs to serve as their
proxy army. The strongest reactions would come from the French and the British
who would oppose the use of ROKs to help the French.
144

------. Memorandum for the President: US Iranian Negotiations, by Stansfield Turner.
Washington: CIA, 1980. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/23914367. This memo
from CIA Director Turner to President Carter provides an assessment of the
Iranian hostage situation. Courses of action are discussed. Possible outcomes are
also addressed.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Statement by the president Upon Signing the Department of
Defense Appropriation Act Online.” Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The
American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/node/233872.
This statement by Eisenhower expresses his displeasure for the outcome of the FY
1959 Defense Appropriations Act. The president is upset because too much
money has been allocated for the base budget. Eisenhower is also upset that
minimum force strengths are set for the reserve forces.
------. “Statement by the president Upon Signing the Joint Resolution on the Defense of
Formosa” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency Project. https://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-thepresident-upon-signing-the-joint-resolution-the-defense-formosa. President
Eisenhower’s statement praises law makers and salutes their patriotism. He says
this resolution is the will of the American people. He ends his statement by
announcing that the Formosa region is vital to the United States national security.
Ford, Gerald R. “Statement on Signing the Continuing Appropriations Resolution.”
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency
Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256205. These are Ford’s official
remarks while signing this bill into law. He scolds Congress over their nearsighted efforts to punish Turkey. He also warns them of the serious
consequences, risking national security by enacting these embargos.
------. “Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.” Online by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256300. These are Ford’s official remarks while
signing this act into law. He criticizes Congress’ cuts to his foreign assistance
programs. Congress cut the budget for every country in the president’s foreign
assistance program. Ford points out that attainment of American goals is highly
unlikely given the budget cuts.
Johnson, Lyndon B. “Statement by the president Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967.” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/node/238303. This is the
signing statement of President Johnson for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.
Johnson is critical of the cut in authorized funds Congress made to this act. His
request was cut by a third and LBJ complains that lack of funds brings the
program to crisis levels.

145

Love, Kennett. Eisenhower Interview: Public Relations (PR-3) Interviews-Kennett Love
with DDE re Suez and Middle East Situation, Nov. 25, 1964, Box No. 4, 1964
Signature File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969,
Dwight D. Presidential Library. This is a transcript of an interview of Eisenhower
conducted in 1964. The subject of this interview is the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower
was asked about the “rocket rattling” of the Soviets and how he responded to it.
National Security Council. Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28. Current
situation in Cuban missile crisis. U. Alexis Johnson. Washington D.C.: FRUS,
1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v1012mSupp/d444. Briefing to the NSC on current situation during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The brief covers disposition of Cuban defenses and efforts to get
air reconnaissance of the Cuban defenses.
------. Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 31, 1958.
374th Meeting of the National Security Council July 31, 1958, Box 10, NSC
Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman
File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This is a transcript of an NSC meeting.
Several issues are brought up including a discussion on American spy satellite
development. The president was briefed that the United States would have spy
satellites in orbit to see behind the “iron curtain.” The first operational spy
satellites were anticipated by March of 1960.
------. Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 20,
1958, 387th Meeting of the National Security Council November 20, 1958, Box
10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann
Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This is the transcript of an NSC
meeting. Several issues are brought up, including a recent study and strategic
exercise. The exercise involved responding to a Soviet nuclear attack.
Eisenhower directs that nuclear targets should include Soviet industrial areas that
are not strictly military in nature.
------. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to
the NSC Planning Board. by James S. Lay. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1954.
https://history.state .gov/historical documents/frus1952-54v13p1/d657. This
memorandum contained an annex prepared for planning considerations for the
possible defeat of French forces in Vietnam. The annex held two assumptions;
one being assisting the French with direct military involvement, the other was a
plan to take over the fight against the Viet Minh should the French quit the fight.

146

------. Memorandum # 341 The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of
Interdepartmental Activities Overseas, 3/2/1966. "NSAM 341 The Direction,
Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas [2 of
2]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7, LBJ Presidential
Library. https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam341. This memo is a
directive from President Johnson to form special groups representing his
cabinet and various agencies for the purpose of coordinating his efforts in the
Vietnam War.
------. Memorandum Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council,
Thursday, February 27, 1958. 356th Meeting of NSC February 27, 1958. Box 9,
NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman
File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This is a transcript of an NSC meeting.
Several issues are brought up including a discussion on the Indonesian civil war.
Eisenhower comments that America will have to go in if the country is taken over
by communism.
------. Memo for the President. Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966."
National Security Action Memorandums. NSF. Box 8. LBJ Presidential
Library. https://www. discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam-b8-f02. This document
contains planning information for LBJ’s administration to deal with the French
withdraw from NATO. The memo contains various guidance from his
principle foreign policy advisors. One paragraph discusses the difficulties of
maintaining support from Congress for European defense activities.
------, Memorandum from Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy), Robert W. Komer and Ulrich Haynes. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1965).
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d194. This memo
from NSC staffers to NSA Bundy spoke of concerns over black civil rights
activists forming groups to influence American foreign policy in Africa. The
concern was over private groups interfering in foreign policy and the racially
motivated views of the group.
------. Memorandum from Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Haiphong &
Hanoi. Winston Lord. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1972. https://history.state.gov/
historical documents/frus1969-76v08/d106. This memo from National Security
Council staffers to Kissinger discusses the pros and cons of resumption of
bombing North Vietnam in 1972. Several factors are considered, from the North
Vietnamese and South Vietnamese perspectives, to regional reactions, and Soviet
and Chinese reactions. Domestic considerations are also discussed.
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------. Memorandum of Discussion at the 376th Meeting of the National Security
Council, S. Everett Gleason. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1958.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v02/d441. This
memorandum for the record is a transcript of an NSC meeting where NASA
and control of military space applications is discussed. The military argues
with NASA for primary control of space weapons development capability.
Eisenhower sides with NASA.
------. Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council.
Marion W. Boggs. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1960).
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d82. This is a
record of a meeting of Eisenhower’s NSC. The discussion is concerns Soviet
nuclear arms and missile capabilities, and American nuclear defensive and
offensive capabilities.
------. Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. Robert Cutler. Washington D.C.:FRUS, 1953.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d50. This
document is a recommendation to Eisenhower by his NSA, Robert Cutler, for
organizing the NSC. Cutler codifies the duties and responsibilities of the
existing members of the NSC and makes recommendations for an expanded
staff.
------. Memorandum from Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Chilean Election.
Viron P. Vaky. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1970. https://history.state.gov/
historical documents/frus1969-76v21/d39. This memo advises Kissinger on the
situation leading up to Chilean elections. Allende is expected to win and try and
turn the country to Marxists practices. The assessment indicates that there will be
Chilean opposition to Allende. The recommendation is for money to be funneled
to Chilean political opposition of Allende.
------. Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs: Solarium Project. Robert Cutler. Washington D.C.:
FRUS, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus195254v02p1/d63. This memo from Eisenhower’s NSA, Robert Cutler, directs a
study, code-named Project Solarium. This produced the basic foreign policy
for Eisenhower’s administration.
------. Memorandum of Conference with the President. By A. J. Goodpastor.
Washington D.C.: NSC, 1958. https://www.eisenhower library.gov/
sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1958-0814.pdf. Discussions on courses of actions to take in response to the Chinese
attack on Quemoy Island. Eisenhower determined that the Formosa Resolution
provided justification to attack China if needed. He also decided that any attack
on mainland China must include the use of atomic weapons.
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------. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, May 29, 1975. Folder: “NSC Meeting, 5/13/1975
(evening)”, box 1, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974-77. Gerald R.
Ford Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/document/ 0312/15
52388.pdf. This is the transcript of the special NSC meeting dealing with the
seizure of an American merchant ship by Cambodians. The president begins the
meeting with demands of why his orders were not followed to prevent or destroy
ships that tried to leave a Cambodian island where Americans were thought to be
held prisoner.
------. Minutes: National Security Council Meeting, October 7, 1974, folder: NSC
Meeting October 7, 1974, box 1, National Security Council Meetings File, 197477. Gerald R. Ford Library.
https://www.fordlibrarymuseumgov/library/document/0312 /1552376.pdf. This is
a transcript of an NSC meeting chaired by Ford. The topic is the SALT II
negotiations. Ford begins by telling his staff to stop the leaks of negotiation
information to the press.
------. National Study Memorandum 36. Vietnamizing the War. by Henry Kissinger.
April 10, 1969. https://www.nixonlibrary. gov/sites/default/files/virtual
library/documents/nssm/nssm_036.pdf. This document prepared for President
Nixon directs a timetable be established to withdraw American forces from
Vietnam and turn the fighting over to South Vietnam.
------. Progress Report on NSC 5405, United States Objectives and Courses of Action
with Respect to Southeast Asia. Washington, D.C: July 30, 1954.
https://www.eisenhower library.gov/sites/default/files/research/onlinedocuments/declassified/fy-2010/1954-07-30.pdf. This report on the status of
foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia was produced after the signing of the
Geneva Peace Accords that ended the French -Indochina War. The report
assesses the accords as a great victory for Communism in the region. It also
predicts that this may lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia to communism. The
report goes on to describe suggested actions America can take to build a regional
program to prevent the spread of communism in the area.
Nixon, Richard. OVAL 656-10; January 26, 1972; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
https://www.nixonlibrary. gov/sites/default/files/virtual library/tape
excerpts/china-656-10a.pdf. Nixon discusses reasons for opening relations with
the Chinese. In this Oval Office meeting, he tells Haig and others that China is
on its way to becoming a peer nuclear power. Its best to open relations now so
the two nations do not get into military fights over policies in the Asia and Pacific
regions.
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------. Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project
https://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241246. This is the signing statement by
Nixon on the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act. Nixon is critical of
Congressional attempts to legislate foreign policy. He states that his signing of
this act does not change the policies of the administration.
Nixon, Richard and Henry A. Kissinger. Richard Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 6
October 1972. Conversation 793-006 (PRDE Excerpt A), Presidential
Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2014–).
http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006749. This recorded conversation
between Kissinger and Nixon discusses their efforts to secure a peace deal
between South and North Vietnam. Nixon’s reelection is part of this discussion.
Nixon repeats that his reelection is very important, and the peace deal will help
his reelection.
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Subjects.
Disarmament: Nuclear test ban negotiations, April 1962-August 1963.
https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/100/JFKPOF-100-014
This memo for the President prepared him for a meeting with the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy to discuss the administration’s proposed Limited Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty. The memo describes the partisanship of some of the senators.
------. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Countries. Vietnam: Subjects: Taylor
Report, 3 November 1961: Tabs E-G. JFKNSF-203-008. John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library and Museum. https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/JFKNSF/203/JFKNSF-203-008. This is a series of
memorandums on South Vietnam prepared for General Taylor. The memos
provide a political and military assessment of the situation. The conclusion of the
assessment is that the current South Vietnamese leader is incapable of improving
the situation and is a major factor for the poor conditions.
Peace Corps. Letter from the Director of the Peace Corps (Shriver) to Secretary of State
Rusk. Sergeant Shriver. Washington, D.C.: FRUS,1961.
https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v25/d71. In this letter
to Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director Shriver asks Rusk to speak to
Senator Fulbright about the amount of money the Peace Corps needs. Shriver
tells Rusk it would be a tragedy if the program did not receive enough money to
carry out JFK’s vison.
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Roberts, Chalmers M. “Personal Papers.” Subject Files. John F. Kennedy: 1962 and
Cuban Missile Crisis. CMRPP-035-006. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum. https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/CMRPP/035/CMRPP-035-006. These memos are a first-hand
account of discussions of the Ex Comm during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The
group speaks of how to conduct a naval blockade but not in such a manner as to
be an act of war. The term “quarantine” is used to announce the blockade.
Planners also discussed how difficult it was to obtain aerial footage of the sites
because of improved anti-air defenses.
Senate Armed Services Committee. Dear Mr. President. Barry Goldwater. Washington
D.C: Senate Armed Services Committee, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff
Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/1/79; Container 119.
https://www.jimmycarter
library.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/119/SSO_148878_119_11.pdf. This letter
from Senator Goldwater to President Carter expresses his intent to challenge the
passage of SALT II through Congress. Goldwater says he supports disarmament
but not this treaty. His argument is that the SALT II treaty is unverifiable and
will only give the Soviets an advantage.
Taiwan Relations Act. Statutes at Large 93 (1979). https://www.congress.gov/bill/96thcongress/house-bill/2479. This act normalizes relations with Communist China
and diplomatically severs relations with Taiwan. The act, however, contains
provisions that, in effect, maintain normal relations with Taiwan. This act also
contains provisions that require Americans weapons and defense materials be
provided to Taiwan in sufficient quantities to allow them to protect against attack
from China.
Telegram. Llewellyn E Thompson to Christian A. Herter. September 8, 1960. Herter,
Christian September 1960, Box 13, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.:
Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library. This telegram from Ambassador Thompson to Sec of State Herter
relates the conversation the Ambassador had with Soviet Premiere Khrushchev.
The Soviet leader discussed the status of two captured pilots of an American RB47 spy plane the Russian shot down over international waters. The timing of the
release was impacted by the American election. The Soviets declined to give the
captive to Eisenhower because they wanted to use them for political capital with
the new president.
United States, Bureau of the Budget and United States. Office of Management and
Budget. "Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954," Budget of the United States
Government. January 9, 1953. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#19007. This is
the formal budget for America for fiscal year 1954.
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------. Office of Management and Budget. "Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959," Budget of
the United States Government. January 13, 1958. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
title/54#19012. This is the formal budget for America for fiscal year 1959.
United States Congress. House. Ad Hoc Committee of Members of the House of
Representatives. Student Views Toward United States Policy in Southeast Asia.
91st Cong., 2nd sess., May 21-22, 1970. https://www.gov
info.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-91hhrg46487/pdf/CHRG-91hhrg46487.pdf. This
special hearing was conducted after a wave of student riots across the U.S.
Students from dozens of universities were allowed several minutes each to give
their views of Nixon’s conduct of the Vietnam war. The primary topic was
Nixon’s Cambodian incursion.
------. House. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
H.R. 2968, Congressional Record. 116-103. (May 23, 2019).
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2968?q=%7B%22search
%22%3A%5B%22Department+of+Defense+Appropriations+Act%22%5D%7D
&r=2&s=4. This unsigned legislation is the proposed United States Defense
budget for fiscal year 2020. It contains specific provisions aimed at thwarting
President Trump’s foreign policies. Specifically, there are provisions preventing
support of any Yemen military operations and prohibiting sales of weapon
systems to Turkey.
------. House. Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. 85th
Cong., 7th Sess., H.J. Resolution 117. (March 9, 1957). https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/85/ hjres117/text. This law gave Eisenhower broad powers in the
Middle East to oppose communism. The authorities allowed him to negotiate,
provide foreign assistance, or use American military force if needed to maintain
any government threatened by armed communist aggressors.
United States Department of Defense. Memorandum from the Aide to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor). by W. H. Bagley.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historical
documents/frus1961-63v02/d314. This memorandum to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff describes the situation in Vietnam in late 1962. The report is on
the effectiveness of the Strategic Hamlet program. The program is failing on
account of poor execution by the Diem government.
------. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wentworth) to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford): JCS Actions with respect to the
Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 29 October 1956.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historical
documents/frus1955-57v16/d407. This memo called for the assembly of a joint
force, consisting of air, ground, naval, and amphibious units to prepare for
combat actions in the Mediterranean area near the Suez Canal.
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------. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy. by
Robert McNamara. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961.
https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v24/d11. This is a
memorandum from Sec of Defense McNamara to JFK. McNamara is responding
to an inquiry from the president about what Eisenhower told them during one of
their turnover meetings. McNamara recalls President Eisenhower saying that all
of South East Asia would fall to communism if Laos fell.
------. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky) to
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). by Adam
Yarmolinsky. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1963.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d129. This memo is
a recommendation from the Department of Defense to JFK’s National Security
Advisor as to how to respond to accusations that the Kennedy administration lied
about a gap between Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons.
------, Memorandum of Conference with Former President (General) Eisenhower. by
Robert McNamara. Gettysburg, PA: DOD, 1962.
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy11_1962
_05_14.pdf. This memo was prepared to report on a conference McNamara had
with former President Eisenhower. The topic was South East Asia. McNamara
issued his recent trip report from a visit to the region to Eisenhower and sought
the president’s opinion on the best course to take on foreign policy.
------. Telephone conversation # 8856. Sound recording. “LBJ and ROBERT
MCNAMARA, 9/14/1965, 11:01AM.” Recordings and Transcripts of
Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library,
https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/tel-08856. This telephone call was about a
bombing program the service chiefs wanted to conduct in Vietnam. General
Wheeler and McNamara are overriding the program. Wheeler tells McNamara
to let him take the lead, and that written justifications need to be prepared to
use in case the service chiefs bring this issue up later.
United States State Department. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for
Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles. by Gerald C. Smith.
Washington, D.C: FRUS, 1958.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d63 This
memorandum of conversation is a dialog between Sec of State Dulles and a policy
planning assistant relates the discussion of US options in dealing with China’s
attacks against Quemoy Island. Atomic weapons use and possible Chinese
repercussions are discussed.
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------. Memorandum for the File: Discussion in Secretary Rusk’s Office at 12 O’clock, 21
August 1962. by John McCone. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1962.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d382. This memo
summarized discussions between CIA Director McCone, Sec of State Rusk, NSA
Bundy, and a few others on Soviet construction on Cuba in August. The intel
reports discussed included the possibility of nuclear IMBMs on Cuba and how the
US would react to this development.
------. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson: Necessary
Actions in Connection with the Marigold Project. by Dean Rusk. Washington
D.C.: FRUS, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196468v05/d4. Sec of State Rusk discusses the negations with Hanoi using the Poles
and Canadians as intermediaries. He also brings up the US bombings near the site
of the negotiations and says there is a need to better coordinate the military
activities to prevent them from interfering with the talks.
------. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations. by
Elliot Richardson. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1969.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d276. This telegram
discusses the Soviet attitudes towards allowing China to join the UN. It directs
members of the American Mission to the UN to help set diplomatic conditions for
communist China’s UN membership. Low-level personal discussions are to be
undertaken to set these conditions.
------. 388. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2,
1960, 5:45 p.m: Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: The
U–2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan. by Parker T. Hart, Washington,
D.C: FRUS, 1960. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus195860v15/d388. This is a transcript of a telephone call from Pakistani foreign
minister to the U.S. Department of State. The foreign minister complains that the
Russians are pressuring them for allowing American U-2 spy planes to fly out of
bases in Pakistan. The Russians are also trying to entice them to break ties with
the U.S. by offering economic incentives.
------. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Parsons) to Acting Secretary of State. by J. Graham Parsons. Washington, D.C.:
FRUS, 1959. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1958-60v17/d236.
This memo to President Eisenhower discusses progress towards U.S. goals in
Indonesia and the current threat of communism. It also discusses foreign military
assistance and how the assistance should not be tied to downed aviator Allen
Pope. The memo also assesses that the Indonesians suspect Pope worked for the
American government but will not bring that information to the public during his
trial.
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------. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, by Cyrus Vance.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1978. Carter Library, National Security Affairs,
Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78. Secret.
Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote: “Cy.” https://history.state.
gov/historical documents/frus1977-80v29/d149. This memo from Vance to
Carter discusses the upcoming vote to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty. Vance
tells of an effort to amend the treaty with the provision that a president can
maintain U.S. troops at the Panama Canal if there is a need to defend or compel
neutrality. Vance reports that Senator Byrd can table this amendment.
------. Memorandum of Conversation. Ogorevo, Russia: FRUS, 1959.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v08/d481. This is a
transcript of a discussion between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Vice President
Nixon. Nixon met with the Premier while on a trip to Moscow to open a US
exhibit at the Moscow Fair.
------. The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State. by John
Peurifoy. Guatemala City, Guatemala: FRUS, 1954. https://history.state. gov
/historical documents/frus1952-54v04/d461. This telegram from Ambassador
Peurifoy describes improving conditions in Guatemala. The ambassador
recommends courses of action that American government could take to raise
tensions to help destabilize the country.
------. Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State. by Robert
McClintock. Beirut, Lebanon: FRUS, 1958. https://history. state.gov/historical
documents/frus1958-60v11/d141. This telegram from Ambassador McClintock
describes his meeting with the Lebanese army commander. McClintock’s efforts
to gain the commander’s trust are hampered by the ambassador’s lack of
information on the U.S. military operation in Beirut.
------. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State. by Jeffrey Caffery.
Cairo, Egypt: FRUS, 1951. https://history.state. gov/historical
documents/frus1951v05/d178. This is a telegram Caffery sent advising the State
Department on negative actions taken by British military authorities in the Suez
Canal Zone. The British cut off fuel supplies to Suez in retaliation for locals
interference with the British train system that supported canal operations.
White House. Congressional Leadership Breakfast. by Frank Moore. Washington D.C.:
White House, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential
Files; Folder: 12/11/79; Container 142. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.
gov/digital_ library/sso/148878/142/SSO_148878_142_02.pdf. This information
package was assembled for a working breakfast Carter held with members of
Congress. The packet included schedules and topics of discussion. Specific
talking points for Carter were prepared for each topic. One topic is Nicaraguan
aid funding requests.
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------. Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary: October 16, 1968, (Washington, D.C.: White
House, 1968), 5. http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/lbj_tools/daily_diary/pdf/
1968/19681016.pdf. This is the daily log of presidential activities. The log has
several entries of various visitors to President Johnson. One visit was from
Senator Dirksen whom the president was upset with, because Dirksen gave a
speech claiming Johnson was trying to gain a peace deal instead of winning the
war to sway votes for the election.
------. Early Month’s Performance, Hamilton Jordon. Washington D.C.: White House,
1977. Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files,
Early Months' Performance, HJ Memos to Pres., 1977, Container 34a.
https://www.jimmy carterlibrary.gov/digital library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_
34a_17-Early_Months_Performance_HJ_Memos.pdf. This memo to President
Carter from his COS Hamilton Jordon, discusses Jordon’s observations during his
early months as COS. Jordon praises the president but admonishes him to do a
better job scheduling his political requirements to prevent arbitrary decision
making. He also wants the president to consider the impact his decisions has on
other projects.
------. Letter from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson. by John F. Kennedy.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historical
documents/frus1961-63v25/d5. This letter from JFK to vice president LBJ
directs Johnson to chair the NSC meetings for him. The president tells Johnson to
prepare himself by obtaining relevant foreign policy information to attended the
NSC meetings.
------. Letter from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President. by
Maxwell Taylor. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. https://history.state.gov
/historical documents/frus1961-63v01/d210. This is a trip report from General
Maxwell Taylor’s assessment tour of South EastAsia for the president. Maxwell
sees the need for military assistance in most countries and probable intervention
in Vietnam to prevent communist forces from overtaking the country.
------. Memorandum by the Chairmen of Exxon Corporation (Jamieson), Mobil Oil
Corporation (Warner), Texaco, Inc. (Granville), and Standard Oil Company of
California (Miller). by J. K. Jamieson, Maurice F. Granville, Rawleigh Warner,
Jr. and Otto N. Miller. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1973.
https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v36/d212. This letter
from the chairmen of several major oil corporations was sent to President Nixon
after the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil embargo threat of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The
chairmen explain the dire circumstances of the oil embargo to the balance of
world energy production. They also believe that America’s position in the Middle
East will be usurped by the Soviets if the embargo is challenged. They ask the
president to not support the Israelis during the war.
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------. Memorandum for the President: The Need for a Definition of US Objectives in SE
Asia. by Chester Bowles. Washington D.C.: White House, 1962.
https://www.jfk library.org/asset-viewer/archives/JCTPP/008/JCTPP-008-012.
This memorandum for the JFK admonishes him to develop a clear policy for
American involvement in South East Asia. Bowles informs the president that US
actions in the region have been undertaken with no clear national objectives.
Bowles’ opinion is that America’s actions are reactionary and at the will of global
forces.
------. Memorandum for the President: Measures to Obtain the Release of the RB-47
Officers, November 10, 1960, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.:
Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library. This memo from the Sec of State and Sec of Defense is a
recommendation for action against the Soviets to obtain the release of two
captured US spy plane pilots. The plan calls for two phases of action. Phase II
was the denial of Soviet ships and aircraft from operating in US territory. Phase
III was the harassment of Russian ships in international waters and the deliberate
downing of a Soviet military airplane in international waters.
------. Memorandum from the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan)
to President Johnson. by Carl T. Rowan. Washington D.C.: White House, 1965.
https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550. Johnson’s
director of information advises him that it will be difficult to justify America’s
large intervention in the Dominican Republic. Suggestions were made to mitigate
the possibility of demonstrations at American missions throughout Latin America.
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson: Agenda for Tuesday Lunch. by McGeorge Bundy.
Washington D.C.: White House, 1965. https://libguides. msubillings.edu/c.php?
g=242157&p=1610550. This memo from Bundy to Johnson lays out the agenda
for the upcoming Tuesday’s lunch. Bundy chides Johnson to establish direct
communication with the Soviets.
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President
Kennedy: British Guiana. by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Washington, D.C.: FRUS,
1961. 525. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d249.
Memo from Art Schlesinger to Kennedy outlining a course of action for British
Guiana. He recommends working with Jagan while at the same time running
covert operations to block communism.
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------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Kennedy. by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.: FRUS,
1961. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v10/d39.
Bundy tells of disagreement between DOD and the CIA with DOS. DOS
recommends caution and careful diplomatic preparation before invading Cuba
with U.S. backed dissidents. DOD and CIA are enthusiastic about the chances
of success for the invasion. Bundy agrees with DOS and recommends JFK
consider DOS concerns.
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Representative for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy. by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.:
FRUS, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v24/d296.
This memo describes the background leading up to the current situation in Laos.
Bundy describes the Laotian government’s force’s inability to hold against an
overwhelming communist force, backed up by NVA regulars and Soviet
equipment.
------. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson: Rolling Thunder 53, by Walter Rostow. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d25. This memo
from the NSA to Johnson goes over a list of targets the JCS is asking for
permission to bomb during the Vietnam War in 1967. The memo refers to maps
that the president uses to reference each target.
------. Memorandum for the President: Your Lunch with Rep. John Murphy. by Zbigniew
Brzezinski. Washington D.C.: White House, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff
Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 1/19/79; Container 103.
https://www.jimmy
carterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/103/SSO_148878_103_12.pdf. This
memorandum from Carter’s NSA provides talking points for the president to use
with Senator Murphy. Murphy is pro-Somoza regime. Carter is against Somoza,
but needs Murphy’s support for congressional legislation.
------. Memorandum for the Record:First Meeting of General Maxwell Taylor’s Board
of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIA. Washington D.C.: FRUS,
1961. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v10/d169.
This document is a transcript of General Maxwell Taylor’s first meeting into
the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.
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------. Memorandum: Jim Mcintyre's Memo of March 1 Concerning Plans for 1980
Budget, by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Washington D.C.: White House, 1978.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/ 148878/68/SSO
_148878_068_11.pdf. This memo from NSA Brzezinski to President Carter is in
reference to budget planning for FY 1980. The OMB is isolating the early
planning to departments with an economic focus. Brzezinski wants the president
to force the OMB to ensure that the NSC and Defense Department are included in
the budget planning early in the process.
------. Memorandum of Conversation, January 27, 1976, folder: “National Security
Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977”, box 17, Memoranda of
Conversations, Ford Administration, Gerald R. Ford Library. https://www.ford
librarymuseum.gov/library /document/0314/1553349.pdf White. This is a
transcript of a discussion Ford has with his UN Ambassador and National
Security Advisor. Ford is upset over Congress’ refusal to provide funds to
support Angola against Cuban-back rebel forces. Ford complains that Congress is
weak and should have to publicly vote to display their soft stances on the Soviets.
------. Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry Kissinger. Washington D.C.: FRUS,
1969. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v32/d96.
Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss arms control talks. They speak of combining
most aspects under a single agreement and other technical aspects of arms control.
Kissinger remarks that US lead arms control negotiator Smith is not allowed to
make decisions on certain aspects of the agreement.
------. Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry Kissinger. Washington D.C.: FRUS,
1972. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v15/d25. Record
of conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The two
discuss several topics including Middle East issues, nuclear agreements, and
Vietnam and the impact of the American presidential elections on negotiating
with Vietnam.
------. Memorandum of Conversation. by Dr. Akalovsky. Vienna, Austria: FRUS, 1961.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v05/d87. This is an
account of the conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the Vienna
Conference to discuss the 1961 Belin Crisis. The topics of discussions are far
ranging, covering South East Asia, nuclear disarmament, Berlin, divided
Germany, and a host of other issues.
------. Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy. by John McCone. Washington
D.C., FRUS, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus196163v10/d385. This memo describes a meeting between JFK and his principle
foreign policy advisors. The discussion centered on planning for the possibility
that the Soviets would demand removal of U.S. installations in Cuban territory.
The removal of obsolete Jupiter missile systems stationed in Turkey was also
discussed during this meeting.
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------. Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files,
Congress/President, Container 34a. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital
_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_10-Congress_president.pdf. COS
memo addressing why a bill failed in Congress. The memo discusses the origins
of congressional friction with the executive branch. It states that some of the
issues are related to Carter’s administration.
------. Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files;
Folder: Cabinet-Congress, 1977; Container 33, 3-4.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov
/digital_library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_04Administration_Review_Goals_
&_Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo_Constituents_Plan_Memo_
1978_Charts.pdf. This is a compilation of assessments of congressional support
studies and notes about Carter’s staff in 1977. It breaks down members by
various demographics. The assessment includes notes for each congress member.
------. Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's
Confidential Files; Folder: Administration Review, Goals & Priorities-First Draft
of December 1977 Memo; Container 33. https://www.jimmy
carterlibrary.gov/digital _library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_02Administration_Review_Goals_&_
Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo.pd. This document is a staff
study conducted by Jordon Hamilton before he took over as Carter’s COS.
Hamilton uses diagrams and examples to illustrate the current White House staff
processes. Included in this study are critiques of the current processes and
recommendations for improvements.
------. National Security Action Memorandum No, 273. by McGeorge Bundy.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1963. https://history.state.gov/ historical
documents/frus1961-63v04/d331. This presidential directive on Vietnam outlined
the general policy of American activities in the conflict. The goal was to set
conditions that enabled the government of South Vietnam to maintain its own
security and defend against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. Once these
conditions were set, American military forces were to be withdrawn from the
conflict.
------. Presidential Directive / NSC-2: The National Security Council System. Jimmy
Carter. Washington D.C.: White House, 1977.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/ assets/documents/directives/pd02.pdf. This
document describes the reorganization of President Carter’s national security
council system. It establishes council membership, subcommittees, and ad hoc
groups. It changes the role of the NSA, affording more power to the DOS.
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------. Presidential Directive / NSC-18: U.S. National Strategy. Jimmy Carter.
Washington D.C.: White House, 1977.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets /documents/directives/pd18.pdf. This
document describes the President Carter’s national security strategy. It outlines
the goals, responsibilities, and regional focus for America’s foreign policy.
------. Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,
Jimmy Carter. Washington D.C.: White House, 1980.
https://jimmycarterlibrary.gov /assets/documents/directives/pd59.pdf. This policy
authorized by Carter directed the study and planning for winning a nuclear war
with the Soviets. The directive emphasized winning the fight versus simply
surviving a nuclear attack. Notable was the explicit direction to target Soviet
civilian activities that supported military capability.
------. Presidential Remarks on Signing of the Trade Act of 1974: Friday, January 3,
1975. by Gerald Ford. Washington D.C.: White House, 1975.
https://www.fordlibrary museum.gov/library/document/0122/1252185.pdf. Ford
comments on his signing of the 1974 Trade Act into law. He writes that the law
will be difficult to implement. The law will also not be received well by other
countries.
------. Reaction to Soviet to the Soviet Satellite. White House Office of the Staff Research
Group. October 16, 1957. Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related
Matters. https://www.eisenhower library.gov/sites/default/files/research/onlinedocuments/sputnik/reaction.pdf. This special report assesses the impact of the
Soviets successful orbit of the Sputnik satellite. It describes America as being
weakened, with the country’s prestige suffering a severe blow. It also reports that
several nations have made statements regarding potentially aligning with the
Soviets due to their perceived superiority in missile and space technology.
------. Summary of Conference at White House. by William H. Jackson. Washington
D.C.: White House. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/
default/files/research /online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1956-09-11.pdf.
This is a summary of a meeting chaired by President Eisenhower. The topic was
how much strategic weapons-grade nuclear fissible material should be produced
and maintained. Discussions also included civilian applications for atomic power.
------. Telephone Call to the President at Augusta, Georgia. J.M. Washington D.C.:
White House, 1958. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/ default/files/
file/declass_fy16_21.pdf. This memorandum of record relates telephone calls
between Eisenhower and a member of the White House staff. The topic is
American efforts to maintain the King of Jordan’s hold over his country.
Concerns of King Hussain are discussed, including requests from the King to help
him improve his security situation. The president comments on how funding cuts
by Congress are damaging efforts to fulfill foreign policy objectives in Jordon.
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------. Telephone Conversation with General Eisenhower. Folder, "January 31, 1968 8:40 a.m. Pueblo 13 - Breakfast with Congressional Leaders & Advisors."
Papers of Tom Johnson. Box 2. LBJ Presidential Library.
https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/pp-johnsontom-mtgnotes-b02-f17. This
memo is a transcript of a telephone conversation between General Eisenhower
and General Goodpastor. The topic was the seizure of the Pueblo spy ship by
the North Koreans. Goodpastor asks Eisenhower’s advice on how to deal with
the situation. Eisenhower offers a range of options ranging from naval
blockade to use of atomic weapons.
------. Telegram from President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith). by
John F. Kennedy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962. https://history.state.gov/
historical documents/frus1961-63v19/d267. This telegram from JFK to the
American ambassador to India instructs the ambassador to work with the Indians
for cooperation in the Kashmir issue. JFK tells that his public statement should
not be misconstrued as lacking support for India. The president also says there is
little time for him to secure funding for India because of pressure from Congress.
------. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield.
by Mike Mansfield and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d231. Telephone
conversation between Jonson and Mansfield discussing Cuba’s shutting off
Guantanamo’s water supply in protest of Cuban fishermen detained by Florida
fishing authorities. The president agreed that establishing their own water supply
would be the best response to Castro.
------. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and European Regional Organizations. by Dean Rusk.
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964. https://history.state.gov/ historical
documents/frus1964-68v13/d191. Rusk sent a telegram to NATO contesting
France’s demand to have all NATO troops and equipment withdrawn from France
by April. Rusk also wanted clarification on NATO forces’ abilities to use French
territory in times of emergency.
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Carter, Jimmy. “University of Notre Dame Commencement.” Speech, Notre Dame, IN,
May 22, 1977. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may22-1977-university-notre-dame-commencement. Carter discusses his foreign
policy during commencement for Notre Dame University. He says America’s
foreign policy will be based on human rights and supported by the people of the
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nuclear disbarment to peace in the Middle East.
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25, 1961. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedyspeeches/berlin-crisis-19610725. JFK addresses the American public after
returning from talks with Soviet Union Premier Khrushchev on the Berlin Crisis
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September 19, 2018, www.jstor.org/stable/3235065. Nathan argues that the War
Powers Act is insufficiently written, allowing presidents to circumvent the intent
of the law, thus thwarting Congressional oversight and authorities of presidential
use of military force. He recommends that the act be re-written to remove
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